THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT: DISSENT, INDETERMINACY, AND
INTERPRETATION AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Jeffrey A. Lefstina
On appeal to the Court of Errors the court was equally
divided. Spencer, Senator, wrote that the indictment was
bad, and Stebbins, Senator, that it was good. The President
gave a casting vote, with the result that the indictment fell.
The closeness of the division attests the measure of the
doubt. . . . It is one of the battlefields of the law.
- CARDOZO1
ABSTRACT
The law of patent claim interpretation articulated by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is commonly supposed to be markedly indeterminate, and
to be responsible for a lack of certainty and predictability in patent infringement
litigation. But there has been no attempt to measure objectively the indeterminacy
associated with patent claim interpretation, or, for that matter, of any other field of law.
This Article shows that under appropriate conditions the indeterminacy of a legal regime
may be measured empirically by the frequency of judicial dissents. Application of this
method to the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence demonstrates that while patent litigation as
a whole is less determinate than other bodies of law overseen by the Federal Circuit,
there is little or no evidence that claim interpretation is any more or less indeterminate
than other aspects of patent law over time. Nor is the law of claim interpretation any less
a
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(N.Y. 1827)), was whether an indictment for conspiracy need set forth the unlawful means employed by the
alleged conspirators.
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determinate than that of another interpretive regime, contract interpretation. When the
indeterminacy of patent law is taken into account, the district courts perform as well, or
better, than the specialized tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit. These findings call
into question the notion that specialized trial courts are necessary to bring certainty or
predictability to patent infringement litigation.
INTRODUCTION
The law of patent claim interpretation, we are told, is a mess. A patent's claims
define with words the limits of the inventor's exclusive rights, just as physical boundaries
may define the limits of real property rights. Perhaps no subject is as central to patent
law. To determine whether a patent has been infringed, or to determine whether the
patent ought to have been granted that patent in the first place, a court must first define
the boundaries of the patent by interpreting its claims. With claim construction the
linchpin of so many disputes in patent law, we would expect the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was vested with nearly complete appellate
jurisdiction over patent matters in order to promote consistency and predictability in
patent law, to have articulated a framework that resolves these central interpretation
questions with a high degree of predictability. Yet this appears not to have been the case.
As one commentator put it:
Claim construction jurisprudence is in disarray. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reverses
trial court claim construction decisions at a worryingly high
rate. The proportion of Federal Circuit claim construction
opinions that include separate concurrences or dissents
continues to grow. And the muddled mix of issues the
Federal Circuit framed for en banc review in the Phillips
case suggests that the court cannot reach consensus on what
the central questions are, much less on how to answer them.
Perhaps the path to adequately predictable claim
construction is continued tinkering with the analytical
constructs internal to the Federal Circuit's claim
2
construction jurisprudence, but that is not likely.
Dire warnings that the appellate courts have left off all stability, predictability,
and certainty are not unique to patent law, nor to this era.3 But at least within patent law,
2

Miller, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 177, 177. (2005).
Llewellyn in 1960 began The Common Law Tradition with that era's lamentation about unpredictability:
"This book starts with the fact that the bar is bothered about our appellate courts - not the much discussed
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on no other question is there such uniformity of opinion as there is on the lack of
uniformity in the law of claim interpretation. Whether it be the substantive principles of
claim interpretation; the procedures (or lack thereof) prescribed by the Federal Circuit for
the district courts to perform claim interpretation; or the manner in which the Federal
Circuit reviews the claim interpretations of the district courts; commentators,
practitioners, trial judges, and even some judges of the Federal Circuit themselves seem
united in their view that uncertainty and unpredictability are the order of the day.4 This
dissatisfaction is more than just the anecdotal grumblings of disappointed litigants.
Empirical studies of patent litigation have shown that a large proportion of district court
5
claim constructions are upset by the Federal Circuit on appeal, and have identified

differences in the methodology of claim construction among the appellate judges
themselves.6 Concerns over the rate at which the Federal Circuit reverses district court
claim constructions have also prompted legislation that would assign patent infringement
actions to specific district courts and judges with experience in patent cases.7 The
Federal Circuit itself was sufficiently moved by worries about its claim construction
jurisprudence to grant en banc review on an unprecedented and extraordinarily wide
array of claim construction questions8 in Phillips v. AWH Corp. in 2004, although the
9

court ultimately addressed few of those questions in its en banc opinion.

Supreme Court alone, but our appellate courts in general. The bar is so much bothered about these courts
that we face a crisis in confidence which packs danger." Though Llewellyn recognized that "roughly since
before Genesis, each new crucial decision has been, for some vocal citizens, the brink of perdition," he
thought the angst of his time to strike at the core of the profession: "[I]t has come to lay a pall and palsy on
heart and hand because it goes to whether there is any reckonability in the work of our appellate courts, any
real stability of footing for the lawyer, be it appellate litigation or in counseling, whether therefore there is
any effective craftsmanship for him to bring to bear to serve his client and justify his being." Llewellyn,
The Common Law Tradition (1960) at 1-2.
4
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231, 231-333 (2005) (“There is concern among the bench and bar that the Federal
Circuit's de novo review of district court claim construction decisions and lack of guidance have caused
considerable unpredictability. . .. criticism over the lack of guidance and unpredictability caused by the
current claim construction process is warranted. The problem is getting worse, not better.”) (footnotes
omitted); Id. at n. 2 (collecting criticisms from judges, scholars, practitioners)
5
See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 1, 8-10 (2001); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction In The
Trial Courts: A Study Showing The Need For Clear Guidance From The Federal Circuit, 33 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 711 (2003).
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See R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment
of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev 1105 (2004)
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See 70 PTCJ (BNA) 657; 72 PTCJ (BNA) 360.
8
376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
9
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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Yet beneath the nearly10 seamless consensus about the unhappy state of the law,
important questions have remained unasked and unanswered. Is the existing empirical
evidence really sufficient to conclude that the law and process of claim interpretation is in
urgent need of repair? More particularly, if the resolution of claim construction disputes
is unpredictable, is this an unusual state of affairs? Or is it one common to other aspects
of patent law and to other fields of law as well? And if participants in the system cannot
predict the outcome of claim construction disputes, is it because the principles of claim
construction are insufficiently determinate, or do such principles exist but remain hidden
from the majority of observers?
This study attempts to answer these questions. Specifically, I attempt to measure
the legal indeterminacy associated with claim construction and other legal issues by
determining the frequency with which various legal issues and regimes provoke dissents
among the judges of the Federal Circuit. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the role of
claims in patent law and the regime currently governing resolution of claim construction
disputes. Part II considers the extant theoretical and empirical work on judicial dissent,
and argues that dissent frequencies at intermediate appellate courts may be used to
measure the indeterminacy of legal regimes. Part III erects a simple theoretical
framework to model quantitatively the relationship between legal indeterminacy and
judicial dissent, and describes the methodology used to implement the model. Part IV
compares dissent rates in appeals originating from the various tribunals reviewed by the
Federal Circuit, to investigate the relative indeterminacy of patent law as a whole against
other bodies of law. Part V reports the frequency of dissent on claim construction and
other issues arising in patent cases, to establish the relative indeterminacy of claim
construction against other aspects of patent law. Part VI describes the theoretical
framework necessary to compare the indeterminacy of different legal regimes between
different courts, and attempts to apply that framework by assessing the indeterminacy of
claim construction against that of another interpretive regime, contract interpretation.
Finally, Part VII considers what conclusions might be drawn from these investigations of
indeterminacy, and what prescriptions they imply for improving certainty in patent
litigation and counseling.
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There are occasional arguments that claim interpretation is not exceptional, at least not in light of the
inherent difficulties in construing language. See 70 BTCJ 657, 659 (testimony of Judge Ellis)
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I.

PATENT CLAIMS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL

A brief exposition of the role of claims and claim interpretation will suffice for
the reader unfamiliar with patent law. A patent on an invention grants the holder the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing the invention in the
United States. Aside from certain formalities, a patent contains only a written description
disclosing the invention to the public, and one or more "claims."11 A patent's claims
define, in words, exactly what "the invention" is. They may be only a few words long or
extend for pages, but in either case they are the raison d'etre of the patent. When we ask
whether the inventor is entitled to a patent, or when we ask against what things and
activities the patent holder may assert the exclusive rights granted by statute,12 the
claims control our inquiry. Whether or not the meaning of the claims is disputed, nearly
all disputes under the patent laws involve at least one of three comparisons with the
claims: a comparison of the claims against what the alleged infringer has made or done,
to determine whether the alleged infringer has infringed the patent; a comparison of the
claims against what was previously known ("the prior art"), to determine whether the
inventor has met the novelty and non-obviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and §
103; or a comparison of the claims against the patent's written description, to determine
whether the inventor has complied with the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The intertwined issues of whether interpretation of patent claims is a question of
fact or law, and whether interpretation is a task for the jury or the judge, divided the
Federal Circuit for more than a decade after its creation.13 In 1995, the court decided
Markman v. Westview Industries en banc, holding (over vigorous dissents) that claim
construction was a matter of law, to be decided by the judge alone, and reviewed de novo
on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that while the question of infringement
itself was guaranteed a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, historical practice and
11

35 U.S.C. § 111. Generally, the disclosure of the written description remains fixed from the point when
the inventor submits her application for a patent to the Patent and Trademark Office. In contrast, the
claims usually evolve over a course of negotiation between the applicant and the patent examiner, in which
the applicant and the examiner reach agreement over what scope of coverage the inventor is entitled to in
light of the statutory standards of patentability.
12
35 U.S.C. § 271. The judicial "doctrine of equivalents" may permit the patent holder to assert
infringement against things not literally encompassed by the claims, but substantially similar to the
invention defined by the claims.
13
See Markman, 52 F.3d 967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (cataloging Federal Circuit opinions conflicting on
issue).
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interpretive competency favored assigning the interpretative task to judges.14 The Court
also reasoned that, at least at the level of the individual patent, treating claim
interpretation as a question of law would promote uniformity of interpretation given that
15
all patent appeals were resolved by the Federal Circuit. Despite the Court's

classification of claim construction as a question of law, following Markman, some
panels of the Federal Circuit persisted in applying a clearly erroneous standard of review
to district courts' claim constructions, on the theory that claim construction frequently
required factual determinations.16 Once again meeting en banc, and once again over
vigorous dissent, the Federal Circuit held in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies that it
would review the district court's claim constructions de novo on appeal.17 Judges on the
Federal Circuit continue to voice their disagreement with de novo review of claim
construction,18 and commentators often identify the de novo standard of review as the
villain principally responsible for high reversal rates and other uncertainties surrounding
claim construction.19
II.

INDETERMINACY AND DISSENT

Interpretation and Indeterminacy
For the most part, the debate over claim construction has not been about
outcomes; few argue that the Federal Circuit systematically interprets patent claims too
narrowly or too broadly. The debate has been over the claim construction process itself.
Criticism of the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence assumes many forms:
commentators most frequently speak of "unpredictability", "uncertainty", "confusion"
and the court's failure to bring about "uniformity." to this aspect of the law. While
different commentators may mean different things when they refer to these unhappy
14

Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 386 (1996).
Id. at 390-91.
16
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
17
Id. at 1456. Several judges of the Federal Circuit, while agreeing with the standard of review enunciated
in Cybor, have maintained that in practice the court accords weight to a well-reasoned claim construction
by the district judge. See, e.g., Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1462-63 (Plager, J., concurring); id. at 1463 (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
18
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1339 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced of the
futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction
is a matter of law devoid of any factual component.").
19
Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1075, 1113 (2001); Staheli, Deserved Deference: Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review for
Claim Construction, 3 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 181, 198-99 (1999). See also District Judge Young’s
comments before the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, 72 PTCJ (BNA) 238 (2006).
15
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states, they all may be taken to cluster around a single norm: the assertion that the legal
regime governing claim construction disputes is indeterminate. Now, "indeterminate"
and "determinate" are loaded words and little can be accomplished without first setting
out what we mean by them. My concern in this work is not whether claims do or do not
have definite meaning, nor is it whether a regime of claim construction free of ambiguity
is possible in the abstract. My concern is practical: whether participants in the patent
system can adequately predict the scope of a patent's claims. When I speak of
indeterminacy I am thereby speaking of what Kress termed epistemological
indeterminacy: not whether there is law, but whether the law can be known.

20

Be known,

by those people whose concern it is to determine the scope of patent rights, namely
lawyers advising clients, and judges deciding cases. To paraphrase one of the
formulations of epistemological determinacy provided by Kress21: a question of claim
22
construction would be epistemologically determinate if the "right" construction would

be arrived at by most reasonable judges and lawyers using a proper method of legal
reasoning.
This definition of determinacy is highly operational, presuming interpreters
embedded in a particular interpretive community, and the context of a particular dispute.
It is also observational and outcome-driven: I do not differentiate at this stage between
reasons why judges and lawyers might not reach the same outcome. Participants may
disagree on the facts; they may agree on facts but disagree on whether or which principle
constrains the outcome upon those facts; they may agree that existing principles do not
constrain the outcome but disagree on what new principles should be supplied; they may
agree upon the facts and substantive principles but disagree on the procedures to be
employed in reaching the outcome. All we are concerned with is the degree to which the
entire legal regime governing claim construction - substance, procedure, and everything
else - permits multiple outcomes upon a particular set of facts. If the law is sufficiently
determinate, predictability and certainty ought to follow; if most participants within the
system would agree that one outcome is the "right answer", then the predictions of
lawyers, the judgments of the district courts, and the rulings of the Federal Circuit ought
20

Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 134, 138 (1990).
Id at 139.
22
Like other interpretive questions in law, interpretation of claims takes not in the abstract, but in the
service of a particular dispute over infringement, validity, or enforceability of the patent. The
21
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to correspond. Consequently, while critics of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence may or
may not be explicitly asserting that the law of claim construction is indeterminate, an
epistemologically determinate system would seem to satisfy most of their objections.
If the alarm over the state of claim construction law is, at its core, a worry that the
current regime of claim construction is indeterminate, how may we evaluate that
indeterminacy? The underpinning of this Article is the thesis that the frequency of
disagreement between judges - the frequency of dissenting opinions - can be used to
measure the indeterminacy of legal regimes or legal issues resolved by appellate judges.
By comparing the frequencies with which dissents occur, we may estimate the relative
indeterminacy of different bodies of law.
The notion that disagreement and dissenting opinions signal the presence of
indeterminacy is not original. Cardozo may have said it first, and certainly most
elegantly: "The closeness of the division attests the measure of the doubt."

23

Dworkin

framed Law's Empire as a work about disagreement,24 although he had relatively little to
say about the nature of disagreement itself. Kress and D'Amato debated whether low
dissent rates at appellate courts signaled that law determinate, or actually proved the law
to be indeterminate.25 However, there has been no systematic attempt to use
disagreement as a probe of the indeterminacy of the law. We must therefore ask: can we
take Cardozo literally? In other words, does division measure doubt?
Measuring Indeterminacy by Dissent
I begin by arguing that judges of an appellate court are the best possible subjects
for an attempt to measure indeterminacy observationally. Judges of any appellate court
consider a case on the basis of a defined set of materials presented to them by the
litigants: briefs, excerpts from the trial record and other supporting documents, and oral
argument. The judges of an appellate court therefore constitute a set of observers
23

See note 1, supra
Dworkin, Law’s Empire 3-11.
25
See Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev 283, 324; D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction, 85 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 113, 114-115. D'Amato argued that dissents are rare because judges recognize that decisions are
"reached by the brute force of majority rule" rather than the rule of law, and therefore judges see no point in
dissenting. Id. at 115. D'Amato's position implies that the judges who do bother to dissent are deluding
themselves; this is may be why D'Amato's subsequent argument focused more on the claim that dissent was
futile, rather than on the claim that judges know dissents to be futile. D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy,
85 Nw. U. L. Rev 148, 157-159 (1990). Neither Kress nor D'Amato has the better of the argument, for the
simple reason that a dissent frequency in isolation is meaningless. See text accompanying nn. ** infra.
24
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presented, at the same point in time, with the same set of facts, and the same set of legal
principles, that might determine the outcome of the case.

26

If determinacy is defined by

the extent to which outcome is determined by a set of legal principles on a set of facts,
then there can be little better test of whether the legal principles are determinative than to
assess whether different observers arrive at the same outcome when presented with the
same legal and factual scenario.27
If indeterminacy permits similarly situated observers to reach different legal
conclusions, we would expect that indeterminate bodies of law would also provoke
disagreements between trial judges and appellate judges; why not then rely on reversal
rates to measure indeterminacy? Although indeterminacy ought to yield reversals as well
as dissents, appellate dissent is a superior measure. Dissent at an appellate court
measures disagreement within a small and relatively fixed group of observers, appellate
judges, while reversal rates represent disagreements between that group and a larger and
more variable population of trial judges. Moreover, the reviewing court and the reviewed
court do not necessarily decide cases on the basis of the same set of facts and principles.
Disagreement between judges occupying different positions in the legal system may arise
not because the law is indeterminate with respect to a given dispute, but because they
view the dispute from different vantage points, and a measure based on reversal may
overstate the effect of indeterminate law. Even if the appellate judges disagree with the
trial court, they may nonetheless affirm its decision under a deferential standard of
review; reversal rates will therefore vary across bodies of law for reasons unrelated to
the indeterminacy of the legal question ab initio. Likewise, considerations of judicial
economy, comity or repose may lead reviewing courts to suppress some proportions of
their disagreement with the reviewed tribunal.

26

Appellate judges may, of course, reach beyond the materials provided by the litigants to obtain principles,
or even facts, not obtained by their colleagues. In such cases, the judicial actors are not deciding the case
on the same basis as each other. Such divergences are expected to be minor if judges share such inputs
with each other either informally, in conference and discussion with each other, or formally, by relying on
them in their written opinions.
27
C. Herman Pritchett, whose studies of the Supreme Court pioneered the analysis of judicial voting in
political science, reached the same conclusion, though his interest was in the behavior of the judges when
freed from legal constraint rather than the legal constraint itself. C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court
(1948) at 240 ("It is, consequently, only where the Court's decision is not unanimous that there is genuine
assurance that the result was influenced by judicial preferences as to public policy. For here we see judges,
working with an identical set of facts, and with roughly comparable training in the law, coming to different
conclusions.")
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Of course, similar criticisms may be leveled against a study of disagreement
between appellate judges. Appellate judges at the same level of the judicial system may
suppress some disagreements with each other because they believe disagreement and
dissent are detrimental to the law or to their court. Well-known anecdotal examples of
such attitudes include John Marshall’s insistence on unanimous opinions in the United
States Supreme Court, and Learned Hand’s view that dissent “cancels the impact of
monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.”28
Appellate judges, when interviewed, maintain that they seek to reach consensus even if it
means compromising on their own view of how a case should be decided.29 But this
desire for consensus is but one of a host of “extra-legal” factors that political scientists
have hypothesized to affect the incidence of dissent in the United States judicial system.
Other factors include organizational and institutional variables, such as size of the court,
professionalism of the court30, workload, heterogeneity of judicial background, the
court’s leadership, inter-court relations, and the internal political process of the court;31
the social and political background against which the judges work, including degree of
the jurisdiction’s urbanization, lack of a societal consensus on controversial issues, or
periods during which social values are in flux;32 and of course, individual characteristics
of judges, including ideology, social background, and perceptions of the judicial role.

33

If all these factors, which we might call "structural variables," contribute to the
incidence of dissent, is it reasonable to assume that the frequency of judicial
disagreement reflects the determinacy of the law itself? Or will the contribution of legal
indeterminacy to dissent be obscured by these extra-legal factors? We must first
recognize that despite the impressive array of hypotheses amassed in the political science
literature to explain dissenting behavior, few have been verified by observation.
According to one survey, only a few of these factors have been directly or indirectly
shown to affect the frequency of dissent: the attitude that dissent is harmful to the court,
the existence of intermediate appellate courts, the degree of urbanization of the

28

LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeal, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 461, 477-78
30
I.e., factors such as organization of the court, policies of judicial selection and retention, administration of
the court, and judicial pay. See Petersen, 43 J. of Politics at 415.
31
See Petersen at 414-20.
32
Petersen, 420-21
33
Id. at 421-23.
29
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jurisdiction, the judge’s ideological orientation, and the workload of the court.34
However, even among those factors that have been shown to affect the frequency of
dissent, contrary findings exist.35
Certainly the influence of structural variables limits how much information can be
extracted from a study of judicial dissent. Most significantly, it highlights the need for a
comparative approach. The observation that judges disagree with each other 1%, or10%,
or 100% of the time means nothing in isolation, because that frequency reflects a
contribution both from the indeterminacy of the legal regime and from organizational,
institutional, or personal factors.36 Neither the magnitude nor the direction of the
contribution of the extra-legal factors can be determined from dissent frequencies alone.
Without an independent measure of the structural variables, the only way to draw strong
conclusions about legal indeterminacy is to compare the frequency of dissent at the same
court37 between different fields of law. If the identity of the court is held constant, then
variations in dissent frequency should be driven by variations in the legal regimes
governing the court's decision, and not the characteristics of the court and its judges.38

34

Petersen regards the first four as having been directly confirmed to affect the frequency of dissent; the
hypothesis that increasing workload decreases dissent he regards as “indirectly” confirmed. See Petersen at
423-424. Petersen also views the hypothesis that difficult question of law produce more dissent to have
been indirectly confirmed.
35
See, e.g., Goldman and Lamb, “Epilogue,” in Judicial Conflict and Consensus, at 285 (discussing studies
contradicting in part earlier findings that increased caseload suppresses judicial dissent).
36
Perhaps the only useful metric is the following: in a case comprising only a single issue, that issue
having two outcomes with equally likely probabilities, we would expect dissents in one-fourth (25%) of
cases adjudicated by three-judge panels, if judges always express disagreement in the form of a dissent. It
is unlikely that any case ever satisfies these conditions.
37
As discussed in Part VI, comparing dissent frequencies between courts is difficult, because the
contribution of extra-legal factors need not be (and is likely not) constant among different courts. The
confounding effects of extra-legal factors may be minimized by comparing courts sharing the same
organizational characteristics (e.g., comparing the United States Courts of Appeal with each other), but
discrepancies between institutional cultures and judges’ personal characteristics complicate comparisons
between different courts.
38
A more accurate statistic would be a judge’s individual dissent frequency when considering a particular
aspect of law, normalized for that judge’s overall tendency to dissent. Normalization to a judge’s overall
dissent frequency would eliminate bias in the measured frequencies of dissent arising from a judge’s
general tendency to agree or disagree with his or her colleagues, although random assignment of judges to
cases ought to eliminate such bias. More significantly, the distribution of normalized individual dissent
frequencies for a given aspect of the law would permit us to determination of whether a high frequency of
dissent in a particular field of law reflects indeterminacy of the law, or an assumed ideological bias of a
particular judge that generates increased disagreement with his or her colleagues when deciding cases
presenting that aspect of the law. That is, if each judge dissents on a particular issue with approximately
equal frequency (after normalizing for each judge’s overall “agreeableness” or “disagreeableness), we
might conclude that dissent on that issue reflects solely the determinacy of the legal regime. In contrast, if
the dissents are distributed such that a few judges contribute disproportionately to the court’s overall
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Conditions of Validity for the Measurement of Indeterminacy by Dissent
We may set forth precisely, though not quantitatively, the conditions under which
a study of dissent frequency is valid as a measure of determinacy of a set of legal
principles. First, and obviously, judicial decision-making must be in part determined by
the legal principles. If judicial behavior is not significantly constrained by legal
principles, then a study of judicial behavior does not provide any information about those
legal principles. Thus, the thesis of radical indeterminacy cannot be true for a study such
as ours to be valid; judges must behave at least some of the time as if they make
decisions based on legal principles they are constrained to obey.39
Second, individual characteristics of judges must cause them to disagree with
each other on the disposition of at least some cases.40 Without disagreements, there are of
course no dissents, and it would be impossible to conclude that the legal principles are
indeterminate. Less obviously, the converse is not true. That is, an absence of judicial
disagreement does not necessarily indicate that the legal principles are determinate. A
court composed of absolutely identical judges would always agree with each other unless
the process of judicial decision was purely stochastic. Therefore, if indeterminacy is to
be revealed through judicial disagreement, judges must possess individual characteristics
that cause them to reach different conclusions when presented with the same set of facts
and the same set of legal principles.
Third, disagreements between judges must be expressed at least some of the time
in the form of dissents. If the legal principles allow judges to reach different conclusions,
and the judges do in fact reach different conclusions due to their individual
characteristics, but the judges fail to express their disagreement in the form of a dissent,
then a study of dissents will underestimate the determinacy of the legal regime.

frequency of dissent on that issue, we might conclude that dissent reflects more idiosyncratic positions of
individual judges.
39
Conversely, at least some cases must be under-determined to permit judges to reach different conclusions
about their resolution; if all cases were so clear as to permit only one outcome, no dissents would appear.
40
Even without disagreement between judges about how a particular case should be resolved, it is
theoretically possible to ascertain “hidden disagreement” between panels of an appellate court considering
similar cases; panel composition data can then be used to extract an estimate of each judge’s position on a
particular issue Such measurements obviously require subjective coding of case outcomes, since the
methodology relies on conflicting outcomes between panels considering similar cases. See Atkins &
Green; Songer; notes ** below. Less obviously, such studies assume the condition that different cases
provide similar opportunities for expression of judicial discretion.
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Fourth, for a comparative study of courts that resolve cases by subsets of the court
(i.e., panels), the absolute incidence of overall indeterminacy or disagreement cannot be
overly large. The need for this condition to prevail may not be immediately apparent, but
follows from essentially statistical grounds and the argument advanced in connection
with the second condition of validity. In any underdetermined case, whether or not a
dissent will be produced will depend on the particular combination of judges considering
the case and the individual characteristics of those judges. Thus, random assignment of
judges to a panel may determine whether or not a particular case generates a dissent. If
the proportion of underdetermined cases is large, then differences between dissent rates
in various fields of law may reflect only an uneven distribution of judges on the panels
hearing cases in those fields. These effects will diminish as the number of cases included
in the study increases.
Fifth and finally, for a comparative study, the extent to which the contribution of
extra-legal factors to the frequency of dissent changes when judges are confronted with
different kinds of cases must be relatively small. If judges follow similar decisionmaking processes in all cases, then the comparative frequency with which they disagree
in different fields of the law will reflect the determinacy of those fields. Judges A and B
may disagree in underdetermined cases because of ideological differences, but that is no
obstacle to identifying the underdetermined cases by judicial disagreement. Suppose,
however, that Judge A follows “ordinary” decision-making processes in most fields of
law, but always rules in favor of one class of litigant in one category of cases. That
category of cases will register a higher dissent frequency than other categories, at least to
the extent that the other categories are free from idiosyncratic behavior of Judge A’s
colleagues. To the extent that indeterminacy is defined solely empirically - the existence
of different outcomes on identical law and fact, without reference to the process by which
judges arrive at those resolutions - then differential behavior across categories of cases is
unobjectionable. If Judge A never votes in favor of the death penalty, then the outcome
of all capital cases may depend on whether Judge A hears the case. However, if we
consider the case of the idiosyncratic judge not to reflect indeterminacy - perhaps because
we think we have some way of identifying the “correct” outcome of capital cases that
does not require us to take Judge A’s behavior into account - then the presence of an
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idiosyncratic judge confounds a measure of determinacy by comparing dissent
frequencies.

41

Having defined the conditions under which a study of dissent rates is valid as a
measure of determinacy, we may now ask to what extent those conditions are fulfilled.
The first three conditions - the requirement of at least partial legal determinacy;
differentiation of judges’ decision-making characteristics; and the expression of
disagreement in dissent - describe the relationship between judicial input and judicial
output. As such, they relate to the internal decision-making process of the judge and are
difficult to disaggregate by any study of judicial behavior. Nonetheless, the second and
third conditions seem easily met: judges are obviously not identical, and the appearance
of judicial dissents indicates that judges do disagree and express their disagreement in
dissents at least some of the time. Some evidence also supports these intuitions: At the
Circuit Courts of Appeals, behavioral analysis of judges’ dissent frequency, when paired
with judges of similar or dissimilar voting behavior, has suggested that neither
jurisprudential norms of unanimity, nor psychological pressures to conform, inhibit
judges from expressing disagreement in the form of a dissent.42
With regard to the first condition, the constraining effect of legal principles, I
have no intention of enlarging the voluminous theoretical literature debating the merits of
indeterminacy theses.43 I confine myself to the question of to what extent legal principles
have been shown to constrain the judicial decision-making process. Operationally the
satisfaction of this condition is easy to define: it requires that a change in the legal
regime that nominally constrains judges (such as statute, precedent of a higher court, or
precedent from one’s own court that cannot be overruled) leads to a change in the
outcomes of the cases decided under that regime. Actually assessing this condition is
another matter entirely. One approach to assessing the validity of the first condition

41

If such idiosyncrasies are exercised evenly across the different categories of cases - whether by the same
judge, or by different judges - then this problem disappears.
42
Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies toward Conformity in a Three Member Small
Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 Social Science Quarterly 41,
52-53 (1973) (“Though in most instances the judges do conform [when placed on a panel with two other
judges who tend to vote together], the frequency of dissent is substantial enough in [this] condition to
suggest that these judges are neither conforming to group pressure nor adhering to a jurisprudential norm of
legal harmony.”) (footnote omitted)
43
See Solum, in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, for review
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independently of judicial behavior might be to ask the judges themselves how they decide
cases. When interviewed, judges of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have reported that they
follow precedent of the Supreme Court even when they disagree with it, although fidelity
to the precedent of their own court is less certain.

44

We might regard the expression of

such attitudes as evidence for the validity of the first condition. Obviously, however,
judges’ self-reported attitudes may or may not reflect their actual decision-making
processes. The only reliable indication of judicial thinking is what can be determined
from judicial behavior: the validity of the first three conditions aggregated together. The
question therefore becomes to what extent actual studies of judicial behavior support the
thesis that judicial disagreement in the form of dissents reflects indeterminacy of the law.
The formal model that legal indeterminacy permits judicial disagreement is
usually ascribed45 to Pritchett’s studies of the United States Supreme Court.46 Certainly
by now, the thesis that judicial disagreement reflects the exercise of judicial discretion in
cases where the law does not determine the outcome has by now been accepted as true, at
least by political scientists who study intermediate appellate courts. As summarized by
Songer, Sheehan and Haire:
Analyses of the decision-making patterns of American
courts have generally operated on the assumption that a
substantial portion of the docket for courts below the
Supreme Court has consisted of ‘easy’ cases in which the
legal texts are determinative so that judges, regardless of
their personal preferences, will mechanically apply the law.
In such cases, judges’ policy preferences can be expected to
be irrelevant to the decision making process. However,
judicial decisions do not appear to be constrained by legal
texts in a substantial number of cases. A wide variety of
analyses have reinforced the conclusion of appeals court
scholar Sheldon Goldman that some cases present judges
‘with choice citations sufficient to alter the outcomes while
other cases do not’. While there is no agreement as to
precisely how many such ‘hard’ cases exist, it is reasonable
44

Goldman (1968) at 476-77
As summarized by Goldman: “Pritchett over two decades ago persuasively argued that cases decided
with public judicial disagreement can be considered to have presented the judges with choices among
limited alternatives. Judicial dissensus is thus taken as an objective indicator that presumably legitimate
conflicting paths to decision were open to the judges. . . . Dissensual case situations are characterized for
the most part (but not) exclusively by the judge’s attitudes/values toward the substantive issues influencing
the decisional path taken.” Goldman (1969) at 217. The referenced works are C. Herman Pritchett, The
Roosevelt Court (New York: Macmillan, 1948) and Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court (Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1954).
46
See Pritchett (1948) at 30 (ascribing increase in Supreme Court dissent to increase in "hard cases").
45
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to assume that judicial discretion exists at least in all ‘nonconsensual’ decisions of the courts. This lack of consensus
is evident when at least one circuit court judge who heard
the case dissents or the circuit court reverses the decision
below. In either of these situations, the existence of
disagreement among some judges would indicate that all of
the judges who participated in the processing of the case
exercised discretion as they determined which side should
prevail.47
The notion that indeterminate cases present opportunities for the exercise of
judicial discretion - and hence disagreement - seems intuitive; it also finds at least
48

indirect support from studies on the fate of legal rules announced in contested opinions.

Less obvious, but no less important for a correlation between determinacy and dissent, is
the notion that apparent judicial agreement reflects the constraint of legal principles.
Does the absence of dissent indicate determinacy? A lack of dissent might merely reflect
a coincidence of the values or attitudes that lead a judge to decide one way or the other in
an indeterminate case, rather than the constraining effect of legal principles.49
Analysis of unanimous judicial opinions is inherently more difficult than analysis
of opinions with dissent,50 and requires the researcher to score cases based on their
outcome rather than merely noting the expression of disagreement. Nonetheless, analysis
of the correlations between judicial “liberalism” and outcome in unanimous and split
labor opinions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals has suggested that judicial attitudes and
values play little role in the resolution of unanimously decided cases.51 The implication is
that, if judicial characteristics do not account for the outcome of the unanimously decided

47

Songer, Sheehan, and Haire, Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals (Univ. of
Mich. Press 2000): (citations omitted). See also Hettinger et al. (2006) at 115 ("Horizontal dissensus is a
reflection of the indeterminacy of legal rules . . . . When political scientists discuss nonunanimous
decisions, . . . they are often referring to such rule indeterminacy.")
48
As part of an inquiry into what factors caused judges on the United States Courts of Appeals to follow or
reject rules promulgated by earlier decisions, Klein evaluated (among other factors) the treatment of rules
announced in unanimous and split opinions, and the relationship between ideology of the earlier and later
judges. Klein concluded that dissents were better explained as indicators of legally problematic issues,
rather than indicators of ideological conflict. David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of
Appeals (2002), at 139-141.
49
See Goldman (1969) at 218; Pritchett (1948) at 240. Coincidence of judicial values or attitudes is
problematic for this study only to the extent that it manifests differentially between the categories of cases
examined. See note ** infra.
50
See generally Green, in Goldman & Lamb (eds) (1986) 139-141, 147-151.
51
Goldman (1969) at 219-20.
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cases, then the most likely explanation is that legal principles dictated the outcome of the
unanimous cases.

5253

But that unanimous opinions emerge from cases in which legal principles dictate
outcome, and that dissenting opinions emerge from cases where the legal principles are
under-determinative are insufficient support for the validity of this study. It is also
necessary, as expressed in the fourth and fifth conditions of validity, that variations in
dissent rates reflect variations in the determinacy of the legal regimes being compared.
The mere existence of variation in dissent rates between fields of law, between periods of
time, or between similar courts, says little by itself. Dissent rates might vary; but this
variation might reflect differences in the determinacy of the cases being compared, rather
than variation in the characteristics of judges that cause them to disagree on the resolution
of underdetermined cases.54
We may pose two tests or predictions that ought to be satisfied if variations in
dissent rates are the result of variations in the determinacy of the legal regimes under
study. The first is positive: Changes in the type of case being considered, more
specifically changes in the determinacy of the legal regime as assessed by some
independent criterion, should yield changes in the rate of judicial dissent. The second is
negative: Variations in dissent rates should not be entirely explained by variables other
than the legal regime in question, such as the structural characteristics of the courts or the
individual characteristics of the judges. If systematic variation remains that cannot be
52

See id at 219-220. Goldman also identifies support for the “consensus proposition” (the proposition that
legal principles dictate the outcome of unanimously decided cases) in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court.
See id at 220-221.
53
We may postulate three other circumstances in which a lack of dissent among appellate judges fails to
reflect the indeterminacy of the law. The first is when opinions, though ostensibly the product of a multijudge court, are in fact the product of only one judge, in which case no disagreement is possible.
Frequently cited is Sickels’s study of zoning cases decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals, in which
court practice assigned zoning cases to individual judges in rotation, despite their nominal consideration by
the entire court. See Robert J. Sickels, “The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the
Maryland Court of Appeals,” 59 American Political Science Review 100-04 (1965). The second is when
individual panels reach unanimous decisions that are nonetheless opposed to the decisions of other panels
of the same court. See Atkins and Green, “Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeal: Illusion or
Reality?” 20 American Journal of Political Science 735-48 (1976); Songer, “Consensual and
Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals,” 26 American
Journal of Political Science 225-39 (1982). The third circumstance is when judges disagree but suppress
disagreement or reach a negotiated compromise. See, e.g., Howard, “On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice,”
52 American Political Science Review 43-55 (1968). So long as these circumstances occur equally
frequently among the fields of law under study, none of them interferes with a study comparing resolution
of different kinds of cases within the same court.
54
See, e.g., Goldman, “Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals 1961-1964,” 60 American
Political Science Review 374, 378 (1966)
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explained by structural variables, it becomes more likely that variations in dissent rate
correlate with variation in the determinacy of the legal regime.
Testing the positive prediction is difficult, for the obvious reason that we have no
outcome-independent method of assessing whether a particular case was undetermined or
not.55 Nonetheless, several indirect tests of this prediction may be found in studies that
have examined the relationship between dissent and an appellate court’s discretion to
control its own docket. On the theory that appellate courts with discretionary dockets
will eschew “easy” cases in favor of ones that pose unsettled or difficult questions of law,
we might expect higher rates of dissent when courts exercise discretion over which
appeals they will hear. The distinction between appeal by leave and appeal by right has
frequently been suggested as a reason for the much higher frequency of dissent observed
in the U.S. Supreme Court than in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

56

But a stronger test would

be to compare dissent frequencies between discretionary and non-discretionary cases in
the same court.57 Such a study has been conducted on the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
which prior to 1982, appeal was by leave in civil cases but by right in criminal cases.58
Dissents arose more frequently in civil cases than criminal cases,59 suggesting that the
discretionary civil appeals were underdetermined compared to the “routine” criminal
appeals.60 However, once statutory changes made the Court’s criminal docket
61
discretionary, the frequency of dissent in criminal appeals approached closely that

observed in the civil appeals.62 Additional support for this hypothesis may be found by

55

One could imagine an experimental approach to evaluating determinacy, such as providing a defined set
of facts and legal constraints to a group of legally trained observers, and assessing whether which the
observers reached identical conclusions. But aside from the difficulties defining and recruiting a qualified
group of legal observers, it is difficult to see how such an experiment could yield information beyond the
determinacy of the exact legal and factual materials provided to the observers. Such materials might or
might not correspond to the actual set of legal and factual materials considered by judges.
56
See, e.g., Goldman & Lamb (1986) at 9-10.
57
Such a test avoids the obvious complications in comparing the U.S. Courts of Appeal, which usually sit in
panels of three judges and are bound to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court,
which sits with nine judges and is not bound by a higher court.
58
Hall, “Docket Control as an Influence on Judicial Voting,” 10 Justice System Journal 243, 245-46 (1985).
59
Prior to 1982, dissents arose in 52.6% of the civil cases but in only 21.6% of the criminal cases. Id. at
250.
60
Id. Hall was unable to identify consistent patterns of individual judges’ voting in her analysis, suggesting
that expression of judges’ policy preferences played little role in the non-unanimous cases. Id. at 251-53.
61
Id. at 246 n. 8.
62
Id. at 252 (reporting that in 1984-85, 58.6% of criminal appeals and 61.4% of civil appeals were decided
unanimously).
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comparing frequencies of dissent between state supreme courts that exercise control over
63
their dockets and those supreme courts whose jurisdiction is obligatory. After

controlling for other variables, 64 analysis of dissent frequencies shows that state supreme
courts exercising control over their dockets register higher frequencies of dissent than do
state supreme courts which have no control over their dockets.65 Thus, to the extent that
the exercise of state supreme court judges’ discretion to hear an appeal correlates with the
indeterminacy of the legal principles presented by that case, the connection between
exercise of docket control and dissent provides strong support for the hypothesis that
variations in determinacy correlate with variations in dissent frequencies.66
A further test of the positive hypothesis is to compare dissent frequencies between
categories of cases thought to be more or less determinate. The difficulty, of course, is
that the validity of such a test is entirely dependent on the subjective judgment of the
researcher that a particular field of law is relatively underdetermined. Nonetheless,
moderately strong support for this prediction may be found in the three-fold increase in
dissent in cases of obligatory jurisdiction at the U.S. Supreme Court after 1925, after the
Judiciary Act eliminated obligatory jurisdiction for most “routine” federal law cases.67
The increase indicates that, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court, cases involving more
68
69
complex principles of law are more likely to generate judicial disagreement.

63

See Glick and Pruet, Dissent in State Supreme Courts: Patterns and Correlates of Conflict, in Goldman
& Lamb (1986) 199, 208.
64
Glick and Pruet’s analysis assessed as independent variables various measures of state social and
economic complexity, political complexity and competition, and complexity of court structure. Id. at 20508.
65
Id. at 206 (finding statistically significant zero order correlation between jurisdiction of supreme court
and dissent frequency).
66
For a contrary example from Australia, see Smyth, What explains Variations in Dissent Rates?: Time
Series Evidence from the High Court, 26 Sydney L. Rev. 221, 238 (2004) (finding no significant
correlation between introduction of discretion and increased dissent on Australia’s High Court)
67
Halpern and Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judge’s Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30
Western Political Quarterly 471, 475 (1977) (finding that percentage of obligatory cases generating dissents
increased from 8.2% to 25.1% after the Judiciary Act, while the frequency of dissent in certiorari cases
only increased from 7.6% to 8.3%). See also id. at 474 n.23 (cataloging fields of law for which appeal by
leave replaced appeal by right).
68
The categories of cases for which appeal by right was eliminated included most general federal question
cases, postal cases, civil rights cases, and cases brought by the United States.
69
See id. (“The increased dissent rate in obligatory cases is explained by the fact that the Act eliminated
appeal as a matter of right in numerous classes of cases which generally raised relatively straightforward
legal issues.”). The observation that appeals classified as involving “public” law - as opposed to “private”
or “criminal” law - tended to generate more dissent at the Arizona Supreme Court over a 60-year period
reinforces, albeit weakly, these conclusions. See John A. Stookey, A Longitudinal Study of the Docket
Composition Theory of Conflict and Consensus, in Goldman & Lamb (eds) (1986) 240, 245. Whether
“public” cases are more complex than “private” or “criminal” cases is open to question. See id. at 251.
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Somewhat more tenuous support for this prediction might be drawn from studies of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, showing that dissent is more frequent in cases for which
Supreme Court review was granted or sought.

70

If indeterminate questions of law prompt

litigants to seek Supreme Court review, or prompt the Supreme Court to grant review,
then the increased frequency of dissent in such cases serves as a marker for
indeterminacy. 71
In sum, while no single study confirms the positive test of the relationship
between determinacy and dissent, taken together, existing empirical work supports the
notion that dissent increases in proportion to certain properties of the legal regime under
study. To the extent that these properties are proxies for determinacy of the legal regime
in question, we may regard as satisfied the condition that less determinate cases provoke
increased expression of judicial dissent.
The negative test or prediction of the hypothesis is that variations in the dissent
frequency for a particular system cannot be explained, at least not entirely, by changes in
structural variables such as the personal characteristics of the judges, or structural
characteristics of the court. At the U.S. Supreme Court, dissent frequencies vary
significantly depending on the justices’ ideological attitudes and social backgrounds.

72

However, such variables have much less success explaining variations in dissent
frequencies at the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

73

Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the

effect of judicial background, Goldman’s examination of all non-unanimous Court of
Appeals decisions from 1965 to 197174, found that all judicial background variables75

70

See Donald A. Songer, Factors Affecting Variation in Rates of Dissent in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in
Goldman & Lamb (eds.) (1986) 117, 122-23 (finding significant increases in dissent in labor and criminal
law cases where Supreme Court review was sought or granted).
71
The obvious difficulty with this interpretation is that the expression of dissent at the appellate court may
well independently encourage litigants to appeal to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court to hear the
case.
72
For review, see Peterson (1981) at 421-22.
73
While not assessing the question directly, Klein's conclusion that legal indeterminacy rather than
ideological conflict better explained the subsequent fate of dissenting opinions may be relevant here as
well. See Klein (2002), supra note **.
74
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 491 (1975).
75
Namely, political party, age, religion, prior experience as a candidate for public office, , prior judicial
service, length of service on the Court of Appeals, and prior experience as a prosecutor. Id. at 501.

20

collectively explained only 5.5% of the variance in judges’ frequency of dissent.76
Likewise, a study of dissent frequencies in criminal and labor cases at the Courts of
Appeals from 1953 to 197577 found no significant connections between dissent frequency
and the court’s workload78 or diversity of political party membership on the panel.79
Consistent with these findings, studies of case outcomes at the Courts of Appeal
(as compared to studies that record judicial disagreement without regard to how the case
was decided80) have found relatively modest correlations between outcome and judicial
characteristics. Other than political party, religion, and age, demographic characteristics
81
of Court of Appeals judges have little or no effect on case outcomes, and even the

effects of party, religion and age are small.82 Even stronger conclusions have been drawn

76

See id. at 500-01. Prior judicial experience was the variable explaining most of the variance in dissent
frequency, accounting for 2.4% of the variance. Id. at 503
77
Songer, in Goldman & Lamb (eds) (1986) 117.
78
Id. at 125-26. These findings contradicted the hypothesis that busy judges would be less inclined to take
the time to prepare dissents.
79
Id. at 128. However, reversing the decision of the district court, diversity of ‘judicial ideology’ on the
panel, and degree of urbanization of the circuit in question were shown to correlate significantly with the
observed frequencies of dissent. These variables did not, however, account for changes in dissent
frequencies over time. Id. at 126-35. Curiously, Songer does not explain what ‘ideology’ is or how it was
determined. His reference to Atkins, supra note ***, might suggest that a process similar to Atkins’s was
followed: identify judicial voting blocks by analysis of en banc decisions, and then ascertain the frequency
with which judges dissent when they are placed on panels with members of the same or different voting
blocs. See Atkins at 46-49. If so, the finding that diversity of judicial ideology provokes dissent might
appear (to the uninitiated) to be the relatively trivial observation that judges who tend to disagree with each
other when the court sits en banc, still disagree with each other when the court sits in panels of three.
80
Studies of outcomes require analysis and subjective coding of the outcome of the case. For example,
outcomes of private economic cases may be coded according to whether “underdogs” (insureds, small
businesses, antitrust plaintiffs, tenants, debtors, bankrupts, buyers of goods, or stockholders) or their
opposites (insurers, large business, antitrust defendants, landlords, creditors, sellers of goods, or
management) prevailed. See, e.g., Goldman (1966) at 376. While a fairly standard mode of analysis in
political science, such classifications are obviously crude and may fail to recognize many subtle
distinctions or biases acted upon by judges.
81
See Goldman (1966) at 381-82 (finding no correlation between outcome and judges’ place of birth,
paternal occupation, type of educational institution attended, prior public office held, district court
experience, bar association leadership, occupation when appointed, length of judicial experience, or ABA
qualification rating);
82
Goldman’s 1965 to 1971 study found that the variance in outcome explained by seven combined
variables of judicial background (political party, age, religion, years of service on the court, and prior
experience as a judge, candidate for public office, or prosecutor) ranged from a high of 37% in labor cases,
to a low of 8% in government fiscal cases, an amount he regarded as “far from spectacular.” Goldman
ultimately concluded: “On balance, party and age seemed to have some limited importance in explaining
the variance in judicial behavior, and the other background variables appeared negligible (with the possible
exception of religion).” Id. at 500-0. Goldman’s overall assessment was distinctly lukewarm: “These
findings lend some slight encouragement to background-behavior research at the aggregate level.” Id. at
505.
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from studies at the district court level. A study83 of all civil rights and prisoner cases
84
filed in three federal district courts, accounting for a significant proportion of federal

filing for the study period,85 found some influence of individual judges on procedure, but
little on outcome.86 Even the effects exerted by individual judges could not be
significantly correlated with the judges’ individual characteristics (such as political party
or appointing president), leading the authors to conclude: “In the mass of cases that are
filed, even civil rights and prisoner cases, the law -- not the judge -- determines the
outcomes.”87
Recent theories of judicial behavior have added strategic behavior - defined as
instances in which a judge's decision is based in whole or in part on the expected
behavior or response of her colleagues, rather than solely according to her own view of
the case - to the repertoire of factors that might contribute to judicial decision-making.88
Strategic behavior could interfere with the correlation of indeterminacy and dissent,
because the decision to dissent would be based in part on considerations other than the
judge's view of the correct disposition of the case. However, a large-scale study of
dissenting opinions in cases at the United States Courts of Appeals from 1970 to 1988,
based essentially on the theory that the dissenting judge employs dissent as a plea for en
banc review from a more (or less) sympathetic court majority, found no evidence of
strategic behavior in the incidence of dissent.89

83

Ashenfelter, Eisenber, and Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on
Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995).
84
The Central District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of
Georgia. Id. at 265.
85
The study examined all cases filed in the three specified districts in 1981. According to the authors,
during the period 1980-81 these three districts accounted for 8.1% of all federal nonbankruptcy filings, and
7.9% and 4.2% of nonprisoner and prisoner civil rights filings respectively. Id.
86
Id. at 281 (“We find that judges influence the procedures within civil rights cases but have relatively little
effect on whether cases settle or win. Further, judicial characteristics such as political party cannot explain
what few effects we see.”).
87
Id.
88
For review, see Hettinger et al (2004), at 123-25.
89
Hettinger et al., (2004), at 133 ("[W]e find no evidence in support of a strategic account of dissenting
opinions on the U.S. Courts of Appeals."). Hettinger et al. did find a strong and significant correlation
between the "legal complexity" of a case and the incidence of dissent. Id. at 134. However, their study
does not support a correlation between indeterminacy and dissent. Hettinger et al. measured "legal
complexity" by the length (in pages) of the opinion and the number of issues considered. The more legal
issues, the more opportunities for dissent, regardless of their determinacy. One might also naively expect
that dissent leads to longer opinions, rather than vice versa.
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Advantages Of The Federal Circuit and Other Intermediate Appellate Courts for
the Study of Dissent
Most studies of dissent, and judicial behavior in general, have focused on the
Supreme Court of the United States. However interesting the Supreme Court may be for
a study of judicial process, as a forum for measuring determinacy of the law, the
Supreme Court suffers from several disadvantages shared with other courts of last resort.
For courts where appeal is by leave rather than by right, the selection of cases is biased
by the discretion of the court to hear the appeal. A court may decline to hear an appeal
for any number of reasons which may or may not be related to the determinacy of the
90
law. Particularly in light of findings that exercise of judicial discretion in the selection

of appeals significantly affects frequencies of dissent,91 a study of determinacy optimally
should be confined to courts in which judges do not control their dockets. The Federal
Circuit, along with other intermediate appellate courts, meets this criterion: appeal is by
right rather than by leave.

92

The Federal Circuit does retain discretion whether to hear

93
interlocutory appeals , raising the possibility that selective hearing of interlocutory

appeals could bias the frequencies of dissent.94 However, the frequency at which the
Federal Circuit grants interlocutory appeals is low enough that such biases, if present,
would be insignificant.
The second advantage of the Federal Circuit as a system for the study of
determinacy lies in the role of stare decisis at the court. When a court is free to overrule
its earlier precedent, disagreement among judges may arise from several distinct sources,
only one of which relates directly to the determinacy of the legal regime. Judges may
disagree on whether existing precedent or statute determines the outcome of the particular
case before the court, in which case disagreement measures indeterminacy. But
disagreement may also reflect disagreement on the merits of the court’s existing

90

E.g., the case may not present an issue the court considers worthy of its attention; the legal issues in the
case may not be properly framed or may not be ripe for decision; the court wishes to wait for further
exploration of the issue in other lower court decisions; the court regards the issue as too politically
sensitive to address, etc.
91
See text accompanying notes *** supra.
92
See 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(1)
93
See 28 U.S.C.1292(b)
94
Such bias would only occur if tendency to grant interlocutory appeal does not correlate with case
determinacy. If the court granted interlocutory appeal with equal frequency among cases with equal levels
of indeterminacy, no bias would result. Such equivalence is likely if the court restricts leave to file an
interlocutory appeal to cases of
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precedent, notwithstanding the clarity of that precedent, or disagreement about the
threshold at which disapproval of the merits of the court’s existing precedent justifies
departing from the principle of stare decisis.

95

All three disagreements may arise when

the Federal Circuit sits en banc, in which case the decision-making process of the court
resembles that of the Supreme Court96. However, when the court sits in panels, the
sources of possible disagreement are fewer. Like the other federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals,97 the Federal Circuit follows the rule (sometimes termed the principle of
“interpanel accord”) that the decision of one panel of the court is binding upon
subsequent panels until the decision is overruled by the court en banc.

98

With rare

exceptions,99 adherence to this rule means that judges in a panel are constrained to follow
the precedent established by earlier panels of the court. Although disagreement with the
existing legal regime may be expressed in a concurring opinion, dissent as an expression
of disagreement with precedent of the court is foreclosed to a judge following the rule of
interpanel accord. In panel decisions of a court that follows the rule of interpanel accord,
dissent at least nominally is confined to indeterminate cases: cases in which the judges
disagree about the identity or meaning of statutes or precedents that control the case, or
disagree about what principles should be promulgated when none yet exist.
The third advantage of the Federal Circuit as a laboratory of dissent arises from its
circumscribed jurisdiction. The diversity of cases which most courts of last resort (and
most intermediate appellate courts as well) hear complicates efforts to measure dissent
rates within or between specific fields of law. The more scattered a court’s jurisdiction,
95

Most famously by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (disagreeing whether stare decisis required adherence to Roe v. Wade)
96
The Federal Circuit is, of course, still constrained to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court.
97
See Am Jur 2nd § 601 (collecting cases).
98
See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.3d 860, 863 (“Counsel is apparently
unaware that a panel of this court is bound by prior precedential decisions unless and until overturned in
banc.”). In its first decision, the Federal Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of its
predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See South Corp. v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
99
See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declining to
follow earlier Federal Circuit panel because earlier panel allegedly did not follow Supreme Court
precedent); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rich, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The most egregious act of the Atlantic panel, however, is its
defiant disregard, for the first time in this court's nearly ten-year history, of its rule that no precedent can be
disregarded or overruled save by an in banc court. . . .”). See also Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563, 578-81
(1965) (noting rare cases of “panel overruling”). Interviews with Circuit Court of Appeals judges have also
revealed perceptions among some judges that fidelity to the rule of interpanel accord is less than absolute.
See Goldman, 1968 Wisc. L. Rev 461, 467.
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the more fields of law its decision address. For the researcher, such diversity is
problematic because it may decrease the number of opinions addressing a field of law making it more difficult to draw robust conclusions from variations in dissent rates - and
because it may increase the difficulty and subjectivity faced by the researcher in
classifying cases. Typically, empirical studies have used relatively crude categories such
as “public,” “private,” “criminal,” “labor,” or “business regulation,”100 or, more
frequently, ignored the distinction between fields of law altogether. In contrast, the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is delimited by a relatively few categories of subject
matter.

101

The limited scope of subject matter makes classifying Federal Circuit cases by

field of law more uniform and less subjective. Furthermore, each field of law within the
Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction arises from one, or at most two, distinct
tribunals.102 The association of tribunal with field of law facilitates first-order
categorization of appeals by the field of law addressed.

103

The ability to easily categorize Federal Circuit appeals by field of law provides
the opportunity to conduct a controlled study, comparing the rate at which Federal Circuit
judges disagree on each of the fields of law within their appellate jurisdiction.
Comparison is between decisions of the same court over the same period of time
minimizes the effect of personal, institutional, or social factors that might affect
frequencies of judicial disagreement. Minimize, not eliminate:

100

personal, institutional,

See, e.g, Goldman (1966) at 376; Songer, Sheehan & Haire (2000) at 105.
28 USC 1295
102
Patent infringement actions usually originate from the district courts, but proceedings to block import of
infringing articles may be brought before the International Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C. §1337(d).
Review of Patent and Trademark Office decisions usually proceeds from administrative boards within the
Office, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, see 28
U.S.C 1295(a)(4)(A),(B); but on occasion review of a BPAI decision arrives at the Federal Circuit by way
of a district court under 35 U.S.C. §§ 145 or § 146.
103
Of course, while classifying cases in such categories as “patent,” “international trade,” or “veterans” is
more accurate than broader categories like “civil v. criminal,” it still conceals enormous diversity of issues
within each category. A customs case from the Court of International Trade, for example, might turn on
something as esoteric as the proper accounting treatment of research and development expenses in an
antidumping proceeding, see, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1369-72
(Fed. Cir. 2005), or as foundational as the proper degree of judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations, see, e.g., Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1306-08 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev’d, ___
U.S. ____. Is it meaningful to assess the determinacy of “international trade” cases in light of such
diversity. Perhaps not. But the endpoint of such reasoning would be that no case can be meaningfully
grouped with any other case, unless the facts and law in the cases are identical. This study discriminates
between various issues in patent cases, but otherwise its conclusions are tempered by the imprecision of its
categories.
101
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or social factors may vary across different fields of law for the same judge.104
Nonetheless, to the extent that personal and institutional factors which might provoke
judicial disagreement remain constant across the fields of law within the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction, then differences in dissent frequency between cases in each field of law
should reflect only the degree to which the law is outcome-determinative in each field of
law. If Judges A, B, and C tend to vote in a bloc because they like each other, then
presumably their affection does not change depending upon the subject matter presented
by the case before the panel. Likewise, institutional norms in favor of unanimity should
not change depending on the particular issues before the court.
The Federal Circuit’s circumscribed jurisdiction may also make judicial conflict
at the Federal Circuit a more accurate proxy for legal indeterminacy than conflict at other
courts would be. It is commonly assumed among judicial scholars, although not proven,
that socially controversial issues are more likely to provoke judicial disagreement.105 The
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction typically does not encompass controversial issues such as
criminal justice or personal liberties; Federal Circuit judges thus would seem less likely
than their colleagues on the regional Circuits to be selected for the bench because they
hold particular ideologies. Notably, in Goldman’s study of the effect of judicial
characteristics on outcomes in the United States Courts of Appeals, the voting patterns
least explainable by judicial background variables were those on government fiscal
issues, assertion of federal jurisdiction, and private economic issues.106 As defined by
Goldman,107 the categories of “government fiscal” and “private economic” seem to
correspond most closely with the caseload of the Federal Circuit, which is dominated by
various money claims against the United States,108 and economic disputes between private
104

See discussion of the fifth condition of validity in text accompanying n. 15 supra.
See Peterson (1981) at 420-21; 424 (classifying hypothesis as “very indirectly confirmed”).
106
Goldman (1975) at 500-01 (reporting percentage of variation accounted for by background variables for
government fiscal, activism, and private economic categories as 7.7%, 12.4%, and 12.8% respectively).
107
Goldman classified as “government fiscal” cases those involving “tax, eminent domain, and other fiscal
cases,” and as “private economic” those addressing insurance, antitrust, commercial, bankruptcy, and
stockholder issues. Id. at 492. See note *** above for his other categories and the percentage of variance
explained by background variables. Of the remaining categories, the only ones that might correspond to a
significant portion of the Federal Circuit’s caseload are labor cases, given that the Federal Circuit hears
appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Office of Personnel Management in federal
employee claims. But these cases, dominated by statutes and regulations applicable only to federal
employees, would seem to share little with the labor-management and NLRB cases tallied by Goldman
from the regional Circuit Courts.
108
E.g., contract claims arising from the various contract appeals boards or the Court of Federal Claims and
veterans’ benefits claims
105
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litigants in patent infringement cases. Of all the federal Article III courts, we would
expect decision-making the Federal Circuit to be least influenced by the political
characteristics of individual judges. Whether the observation that decision-making is
instead influenced by immeasurable characteristics of individual judges comes any closer
to revealing indeterminacy of the legal regime is a theoretical question I do not seek to
resolve. Nonetheless, to the extent that conflict stemming from polarization of judges
along political or demographic axes is viewed as undesirable in a study of determinacy, a
study focusing on the Federal Circuit is least affected by such conflict.
III.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEASURING INDETERMINACY

A Simple Model of the Incidence of Dissent
From the foregoing examination of the extant literature on the causes of judicial
dissent, the causes of judicial dissent may be summarized crudely but concisely:
indeterminate issues of law contribute to the expression of appellate dissent, but so do a
range of other factors, such as the personal characteristics and policy preferences of the
judges, the organization and procedures of the court, and cultural and psychological
factors rooted in the group dynamics of the court and its decision-making process. If our
interest is on legal indeterminacy alone, we may construct a simple model of the process
underlying the expression of dissent in an appellate opinion. To do so, I separate
indeterminacy in the legal regime from all other factors that generate or suppress dissent,
and group the latter into an undifferentiated category I term "structural variables."

109

If

legal indeterminacy and structural variables both contribute to the likelihood that a judge
will dissent in a given case, then for a case containing issue x, the probability of the
opinion containing a dissent on issue x may be represented as:
Px = Ix × SC
where Px represents the probability of dissent on issue x, Ix represents the legal
indeterminacy of issue x, and SC represents the combined effects of all structural variables

109

The predominant component of SC is likely the social acceptability of dissent at a particular court.
Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek built a multinominal logit model including separate parameters for
individual and court characteristics to explore the causes of dissent at the regional Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the period 1960 to 1996. Hettinger et al., Judging on a Collegial Court (2006). The court's
overall separate opinion rate was by far the factor contributing most significantly to the probability of
dissent in a given case. See Hettinger et al at 66; 71; 67 (showing that variable representing circuit norms
had greatest influence on probability of dissent or concurrence).
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at a specified court C. Rearrangement of this equation yields a measure of indeterminacy
for issue x:

Ix =

Px
SC

With a sufficient number of cases, the probability of dissent may be estimated
from the observed frequency of dissent. However, to determine Px experimentally, we
must measure the frequency at which dissents appear only in cases which Px was
considered by the appellate court. Without such a restriction, the frequency of dissent
reflects both the frequency with which a judge dissented on issue x, and the frequency
with which issue x appeared in the set of cases under study: regardless of indeterminacy,
rare issues would generate few dissents and common issues would generate many. We
may therefore compare dissent frequencies between various legal issues only if we know
the number of cases in which those legal issues were in dispute.
Despite the requirement that the set of cases under study must be restricted to
those presented issue x, issue x may be defined narrowly as a single issue, or broadly as a
collection of legal issues, so long as we understand that our conclusions about the
determinacy of legal issues are only as specific as our definition of the issues.110
Likewise, court C may represent a single court or a group of courts, so long as the
boundaries of that definition are respected in subsequent calculations.
We may determine the absolute magnitude of Ix only by measuring both the
frequency of dissent Px, and the contribution of structural variables SC. However, we lack
any means to measure the contribution of structural variables independently of dissent
frequencies. Without quantifying SC, it is impossible to measure the absolute magnitude
of the indeterminacy parameter Ix.
It is nonetheless possible to measure the relative indeterminacy of two different
legal regimes as applied by a single court, provided we make a simplifying assumption.
The assumption is that SC remains constant

111

and independent of Ix; in other words, I

assume that the structural variables provoking or suppressing dissent do not change

110

Because any higher-level definition of a "legal issue" allegedly common to more than one case can
readily be broken down into as many "sub-issues" as there are distinct fact patterns, the boundaries of a
"legal issue" are arbitrary.
111
The contribution of structural variables may change over time, particularly as the personnel of a court
shifts. It is therefore necessary to specify a time frame for each instance of Sc.
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depending on what issues the court is considering.112 If the contribution of structural
variables is the same between two issues x and y, then the structural variables drop out of
the comparison entirely:

Ix Px × SC Px
=
=
Iy Py × SC Py
Accordingly, the relative indeterminacy of issues x and y at the same court may be
measured by comparing the frequency of dissents on issue x in cases presenting issue x,
and the frequency of dissents on issue y in cases presenting issue y.

Dataset Selection
I focus in this study on judicial disagreement expressed in the form of a dissenting
opinion. To do so unquestionably underestimates the absolute frequency of
indeterminate cases. Judicial disagreement is also expressed in concurring opinions, and
a study of dissent alone will exclude instances of judicial disagreement.113 Some
researchers therefore include concurring opinions in measurements of judicial
disagreement.114 There are, however, compelling reasons to concentrate on the frequency
of dissent alone. Only the dissenting opinion is an unambiguous declaration that the
dissenting judge disagreed with the outcome reached by the majority. The concurring
judge is not so easy to pin down: he may agree with the outcome but disagree with the
reasoning adopted by the majority; he may agree that the legal regime dictates the
outcome of the case but wish to express dissatisfaction with that legal regime;

he may

be engaged in pre-emptive exegesis of the opinion to influence future cases; he may wish
112

This assumption follows from the third condition of validity set forth in Part II. One might imagine that
some judges feel more strongly about certain issues than others and thus be more likely to take the trouble
to write a dissent depending on the issue. However, while the effects of such variation might be significant
at the level of the individual judge, they will be submerged when Sc is calculated as the aggregate structural
variable for all the judges of the court. Furthermore, to the extent the question has been examined in the
literature, the data do not support issue-dependence of an individual judge's tendency to dissent. Although
not focused on the precise point discussed here, Goldman's 1975 study of the United States Courts of
Appeals found no correlation between voting behavior, as measured by outcome on a series of political and
economic issues selected to represent a liberal-conservative axis, and tendency for a judge to dissent. See
Goldman (1975) at 494-95.
113
As discussed in the text accompanying notes *** supra, outcome-focused studies find evidence of
conflict even in unanimously decided cases, by identifying judge-dependent discrepancies in outcomes
from different panels of the same court.
114
See, e.g., Unah (2001) at 71; Wasby, in Goldman & Lamb (1986). It may be particularly tempting for
studies of intermediate courts to classify concurring opinions as disagreements because the absolute
incidence of both opinions is low; aggregation of dissents and concurrences increases the likelihood that
statistically significant conclusions may be drawn from the data.
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to criticize (or expand) dictum in the majority opinion. Only the first of these
possibilities represents a disagreement arising from the indeterminacy of the legal regime,
and disentangling them requires subjective judgments by the researcher about the degree
to which the concurring judge expresses agreement or disagreement with the majority
opinion.

115

Moreover, given that absolute frequencies of judicial disagreement mean

little,116 systematic underestimation of the absolute frequency of disagreement is
acceptable. In a comparative study, underestimation of the absolute frequency of
disagreement due to the omission of concurrences is problematic only if the relative
expression of disagreement in dissents and concurrences varies between the fields of law
(or time periods) under study. If the proportion of disagreement expressed by dissents
and concurrences remains constant, then changes in the frequency of dissent accurately
represents changes in the frequency of disagreement. Evidence that the frequency of
concurrence in the Circuit Courts of Appeals correlates tightly with the frequency of
dissent

117

supports this proposition.

I exclude from all aspects of this study two categories of judgments: judgments
rendered by the court sitting en banc, and judgments in which the court affirms the
opinion of the lower tribunal without a written opinion. Exclusion of the en banc cases
follows from the principal aim of this study: to assess the determinacy of the legal
regimes governing ordinary patent cases. As in other Circuit Courts of Appeals, the vast
majority of appealed cases at the Federal Circuit are resolved by three-judge panels rather
than the court sitting en banc. In both instances, the court is nominally constrained by
statute and by precedent of the Supreme Court. When the court sits in panels, decisionmaking is further constrained by precedents of the Federal Circuit, whether from earlier
panels or from the court sitting en banc. The constraint of precedent is lifted when the
court sits en banc, for the court is free to overrule its prior precedent of either origin. As
the volume of precedent has grown, the constraint of Federal Circuit precedent is likely to
be more significant than the constraint of statute or Supreme Court precedent, given the
large number of factual or legal scenarios addressed by Federal Circuit precedent. Aside
from the fact that en banc cases are by definition extraordinary (and rare), disagreement
115

See Andrew Lynch, Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in The High
Court of Australia, 24 Sydney L. Rev. 470, 487-91 (2002).
116
See text accompanying notes *** supra
117
See Atkins and Green, (1976).
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in en banc cases will not reflect the determinacy of “ordinary” patent cases because the
main constraint governing ordinary patent cases has been lifted. Crudely speaking,
judges en banc are more likely disagreeing about what the law should be, rather than
what it is. To be sure, disagreement en banc also arises from indeterminacy of statute or
Supreme Court precedent, and panel opinions also confront questions of first impression.
Nonetheless, the fundamental differences in the legal regime and the decision-making
process in en banc cases render them uninformative about the general determinacy of
patent cases.
I also exclude those cases in which the appellate court affirms the judgment of the
tribunal below without written opinion. This exclusion is not justifiable on theoretical
grounds: these appeals are likely to be the ones in which the reviewing judges perceived
the resolution of the case to be so determined by the legal regime that no explication was
necessary.

118

While exploration of the universe of summarily affirmed cases is possible, it

is extremely resource-intensive.119 Nonetheless, as with most other systematic sources of
error in this study, distortions introduced by excluding summary affirmances are
problematic if one wishes to draw conclusions from the absolute magnitude of judicial
disagreement,120 but interfere with a comparative study only to the extent that the factors
121
(other than those connected with case determinacy) influencing the court’s decision to

affirm without opinion vary over time, or between the fields of law under study.

118

Some smaller proportion no doubt represents the opposite: cases in which the resolution is so difficult
that judicial agreement can be achieved only by abandoning any attempt at a reasoned opinion.
119
See Moore, 9 Lewis & Clark Review 231, 236 (2005). Ascertaining the originating tribunal would be
possible by manual review of all summary affirmances, since the judgment usually reports the originating
tribunal. However, determining what issues were present requires obtaining all the appellate briefs to
determine what issues were presented to the court by the litigants. See id. Even such painstaking analysis
may be incomplete if the issues actually considered by the appellate judges differ from those perceived by
the researcher upon perusing the appellate briefs.
120
See, e.g., id. at 235-36 (showing variation in district court reversal rates dependent on exclusion of
summary affirmances)
121
If the decision to affirm without opinion is influenced only by the degree of determinacy of the case e.g., the court affirms without opinion all cases over a particular threshold of determinacy - then the
opinions that remain will, to a first approximation, still reflect the levels of indeterminacy characteristic of
each field or time period in question. The numbers of opinions issuing from determinate fields will of
course be smaller than the numbers of opinions issuing from indeterminate fields, but the frequency of
disagreement in those opinions will still reflect determinacy. Note that the validity of the preceding
argument depends on the assumption that the distribution of indeterminacy is similar in shape (though not
in magnitude) among the sets of cases being compared.
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A Note on Statistical Methodology
This study is concerned with the influence of law on judicial behavior. Its data
are confined to the records of judicial behavior, judicial opinions, and its conclusions are
limited to the judicial process. Within those limitations, I generally collect data on the
entire population of cases meeting the time and subject criteria of interest. This does not
negate the necessity of statistical analysis. The statistical question of interest is not
whether observations from these cases are relevant to any other population, but whether
we can make inferences about the process of judicial decision-making that produced the
cases. The model of judicial behavior described above posits that both legal and
structural parameters contribute to a probability of disagreement each time an appellate
panel applies law to the circumstances of a case. Whether one regards this as a purely
stochastic process or a judicial sampling of an underlying distribution of case facts,

122

we

would like to know how closely the observed frequencies of judicial dissent estimate the
underlying probability of dissent, and whether observed differences between dissent
frequencies can be interpreted as differences in the underlying probabilities. The
statistical tools applicable to such questions are logistic regression and the chi-squared
test of distributions. Neither of these tools requires the assumption common to
parametric methods, that a sample be normally distributed around a mean; so long as the
sample is random and sufficiently large, there are no constraints on distribution. By
convention, differences are deemed statistically significant at the 95% level, and such
significant differences are marked with an asterisk in tables.
IV.

DISSENT AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Judicial disagreement and originating tribunal
To begin the characterization of the Federal Circuit, the overall dissent frequency
in all opinions of the Federal Circuit from 1983 through the first six months of 2005,
excluding only en banc cases and summary affirmances, was determined. A text-based
search strategy, followed by manual review, classified the published and unpublished

122

The choice of perspective determines how one interprets the meaning of legal indeterminacy defined by
the model. The definition employed in this study is operational, meaning that it measures how often
application of law to fact yields a determinate result. Whether indeterminate results are the fault of the law
or the facts is a matter of perspective.
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opinions reported in the LEXIS database according to originating tribunal,123 and the
124

number of dissenting opinions.

The Federal Circuit reviews cases originating from ten

distinct sets of tribunals.125 The number of panel opinions and dissents in cases
originating from each tribunal, totaling 16,174 and 683 respectively, is shown in Table 1.
The corresponding frequencies of dissent are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 1: CASES AND DISSENTS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1983-2005
Year

BCA

CIT

CFC

District
Courts

CAVC

Cases Dissents Cases Dissents Cases Dissents Cases

DVA

ITC

Dissents CasesDissentsCases

Senate
Comm.

MSPB

Dissents Cases Dissents Cases

PTO

Dissents CasesDissentsCases Dissents

1983

31

3

16

1

65

6

0

0

46

4

0

0

4

0

156

4

0

0

30

5

1984

40

2

29

3

92

4

0

0 112

10

0

0

3

0

325

5

0

0

23

2

1985

26

1

22

0

109

1

0

0 112

10

0

0

9

1

472

2

0

0

31

2

1986

32

0

24

2

81

2

0

0 129

6

0

0

10

0

487

6

0

0

51

1

1987

36

1

23

0

66

6

0

0 121

10

0

0

6

0

265

4

0

0

68

3

1988

50

5

33

1

83

6

0

0 126

9

0

0

9

0

194

6

0

0

73

5

1989

56

1

32

3

54

2

0

0 130

7

0

0

4

0

217

1

0

0

66

5

1990

53

4

32

1

84

6

1

0 142

2

0

0

4

0

252

2

0

0

82

3

1991

43

1

23

2

101

6

23

0 123

4

2

0

4

0

283

2

0

0

78

2

1992

40

2

19

1

109

1

24

0 140

5

0

0

2

0

372

2

0

0

77

3

123

The search strategy took advantage of the LEXIS “posture” and “history” fields to classify opinions
according to the originating tribunal, followed by the appropriate date restriction. The search terms for
each category were as follows. For the agency boards of contract appeals: posture (board /5 contract) or
history (board /5 contract); for the Court of International Trade: posture (court /5 trade) or history (court /5
trade); for the Court of Federal Claims: posture ("claims court" or "federal claims") or history ("federal
claims" or "claims court"); for the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: posture (court /5 veterans) or
history (court /5 veterans); for all district courts: posture (court /5 district) or history (court /5 district); for
the Department of Veterans Affairs: posture (department /5 veterans) or history (department /5 veterans);
for the International Trade Commission: posture (trade /5 commission) or history (trade /5 commission);
for the Merit Systems Protection Board: posture (merit /5 board) or history (merit /5 board); for the Senate
Select Committee on Ethics: posture (senate) or history (senate); for the Patent and Trademark Office:
posture ((patent or trademark) /5 board) or history ((patent or trademark) /5 board). District court cases
arising under the Little Tucker Act (those provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 specified by 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(2)) were identified by searching for ("little tucker" or (28 /5 "1346") or (28 /5 "1295(a)(2)") in the
case body. The set of cases retrieved was further screened manually to eliminate spurious retrievals and
instances of duplicates where the databases contain both the opinion and a document reporting the
judgment. The number of en banc cases in each time period was determined by identifying cases in which
more than three judges heard the appeal, and subtracting these numbers from the search results.
124
Dissents were identified by the search term "(dissent! /10 judge)".
125
This study follows the classification used by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in its statistical
reports. Under this classification, the Federal Circuit reviews cases originating at the Boards of Contract
Appeals (BCA), the Court of International Trade (CIT), the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), the district courts, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), the
International Trade Commission (ITC), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). A few federal employee decisions originate directly from the Office of
Personnel Management, which are here consolidated with cases originating from the MSPB. The court also
reviews a very small number of determinations involving Congressional employees originating at the
Senate Select Committee on Ethics or, since 1995, the Office of Compliance (Senate Comm.). 28 U.S.C. §
1295 vests the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over a few miscellaneous appeals, of which there have been
few or none since the court's inception.
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1993

53

3

26

0

141

10

20

0 161

9

0

0

3

0

353

2

0

0

79

5

1994

56

3

34

1

112

7

21

2 153

9

0

0

2

0

326

2

1

0

43

2

1995

40

2

40

2

119

9

9

1 173

21

1

0

4

0

411

8

2

0

57

4

1996

29

2

36

5

109

4

14

0 196

16

0

0

6

1

392

4

1

0

38

3

1997

61

1

44

5

101

7

19

0 217

9

0

0

9

0

249

4

0

0

54

4

1998

44

0

49

4

112

7

41

2 208

14

1

0

4

0

225

4

0

0

24

1

1999

29

1

42

3

113

6

60

2 210

16

1

0

4

0

262

3

1

0

43

3

2000

24

0

23

4

104

5

90

2 222

10

3

0

1

0

288

3

0

0

35

1

2001

24

0

30

0

96

7

71

3 254

19

2

0

7

0

279

6

0

0

49

2

2002

34

4

28

6

116

7

43

2 222

22

4

0

1

0

222

7

0

0

50

4

2003

26

1

39

6

114

6

52

2 223

25

5

1

2

1

238

7

0

0

43

4

2004
Jan-Jun
2005

29

3

44

6

109

11

46

2 211

28

0

0

6

0

226

1

0

0

42

2

8

0

22

1

59

2

28

3 140

12

0

0

1

0

138

8

0

0

21

0

864

40

710

57

2249

128

562

21 3771

277

19

1

105

3

6632

93

5

0

1157

66

Total

34

TABLE 2: DISSENT FREQUENCY AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1983-2005
Year

BCA

CIT

CFC

CAVC District Courts

DVA

ITC

MSPB Senate Comm.

PTO

1983

9.68%

6.25%

9.23%

N/C

8.70%

N/C

0.00% 2.56%

N/C

16.67%

1984

5.00% 10.34%

4.35%

N/C

8.93%

N/C

0.00% 1.54%

N/C

8.70%

1985

3.85%

0.00%

0.92%

N/C

8.93%

N/C

11.11% 0.42%

N/C

6.45%

1986

0.00%

8.33%

2.47%

N/C

4.65%

N/C

0.00% 1.23%

N/C

1.96%

1987

2.78%

0.00%

9.09%

N/C

8.26%

N/C

0.00% 1.51%

N/C

4.41%

1988 10.00%

3.03%

7.23%

N/C

7.14%

N/C

0.00% 3.09%

N/C

6.85%

1989

1.79%

9.38%

3.70%

N/C

5.38%

N/C

0.00% 0.46%

N/C

7.58%

1990

7.55%

3.13%

7.14%

0.00%

1.41%

N/C

0.00% 0.79%

N/C

3.66%

1991

2.33%

8.70%

5.94%

0.00%

3.25%

0.00% 0.71%

N/C

2.56%

1992

5.00%

5.26%

0.92%

0.00%

3.57%

N/C

0.00% 0.54%

N/C

3.90%

1993

5.66%

0.00%

7.09%

0.00%

5.59%

N/C

0.00% 0.57%

N/C

1994

5.36%

2.94%

6.25%

9.52%

5.88%

N/C

0.00% 0.61%

0.00%

4.65%

1995

5.00%

5.00%

7.56% 11.11%

12.14%

0.00% 1.95%

0.00%

7.02%

1996

6.90% 13.89%

3.67%

0.00%

8.16%

N/C

16.67% 1.02%

0.00%

7.89%

1997

1.64% 11.36%

6.93%

0.00%

4.15%

N/C

0.00% 1.61%

N/C

7.41%

1998

0.00%

8.16%

6.25%

4.88%

6.73%

0.00%

0.00% 1.78%

N/C

4.17%

1999

3.45%

7.14%

5.31%

3.33%

7.62%

0.00%

0.00% 1.15%

2000

0.00% 17.39%

4.81%

2.22%

4.50%

0.00%

0.00% 1.04%

N/C

2.86%

2001

0.00%

0.00%

7.29%

4.23%

7.48%

0.00%

0.00% 2.15%

N/C

4.08%

2002 11.76% 21.43%

6.03%

4.65%

9.91%

0.00%

0.00% 3.15%

N/C

8.00%

2003

5.26%

3.85%

11.21%

20.00% 50.00% 2.94%

N/C

9.30%

2004 10.34% 13.64% 10.09%

4.35%

13.27%

N/C

0.00% 0.44%

N/C

4.76%

N/C

0.00% 5.80%

N/C

3.85% 15.38%

Jan-Jun 2005

0.00%

4.55%

3.39% 10.71%

8.57%

Total

4.63%

8.03%

5.69%

7.35%

3.74%

0.00%

0.00%

5.26%

6.33%

0.00%

2.86% 1.40%

6.98%

0.00%
0.00%

5.70%

(N/C, no cases)
Table 3 reports selected statistics derived from the tribunal dissent frequencies:
the dissent frequencies for all Federal Circuit opinions; the dissent frequencies for all
Federal Circuit opinions excepting those originating from the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and the dissent frequencies for opinions originating from the district courts
excepting those in which the district court's jurisdiction was based on a monetary claim
against the United States under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2). Excluding
cases brought under the Little Tucker Act restricts the district court cases almost entirely
to patent matters, including appeals in civil actions filed to challenge a decision of the
Patent and Trademark Office on patentability, priority, or term adjustment.126
TABLE 3: SUMMARY DISSENT FREQUENCIES, 1983-2005

126

See 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(C) (granting Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in certain civil
actions against the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office under Title 35).
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Year

All Cases
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
(Jan-Jun)

Total

6.63%
4.19%
2.06%
1.75%
4.00%
5.56%
3.41%
2.63%
2.37%
1.80%
3.50%
3.36%
5.39%
4.16%
3.98%
4.53%
4.44%
3.18%
4.48%
7.27%
7.14%
7.07%
6.31%

All Cases No
District Court
MSPB
Patent Cases
9.95%
8.89%
7.09%
9.17%
4.59%
8.33%
2.54%
2.56%
6.13%
8.11%
6.87%
6.90%
5.29%
5.47%
3.80%
0.72%
3.56%
2.52%
2.97%
3.76%
5.67%
5.84%
5.49%
5.33%
8.58%
11.70%
7.06%
7.81%
5.15%
4.15%
5.81%
6.76%
6.16%
7.62%
4.41%
4.57%
5.71%
7.32%
9.13%
10.14%
9.13%
11.21%
10.19%
12.20%
6.57%
8.89%

4.20%

6.19%

7.14%

Excluding the miniscule number of Congressional employee cases, dissent
frequencies from the Federal Circuit's inception through mid-2005 ranged from a low of
1.40% for cases originating at the Merit Systems Protection Board, to a high of 8.03% for
cases originating at the Court of International Trade. The total dissent frequency for all
opinions rendered by the Federal Circuit is 4.20%, as shown in Table 3. The reader
should bear in mind that this statistic is weighted by the number of cases resolved by the
Circuit, as shown in Table 1. For example, over one-third of the Federal Circuit's cases
are appeals on Federal employee matters originating from the Merit Systems Protection
Board. Such appeals, usually resolved without oral argument, generate little
disagreement. Excluding these cases from the analysis would raise the Federal Circuit's
cumulative dissent frequency to 6.19%.
The originating tribunal statistics obscure a great deal of complexity, because
classification by originating tribunal is a broad measure. These statistics aggregate all the
disparate legal issues that may arise in cases originating from a given tribunal. We may

36

therefore draw conclusions only about the relative indeterminacy of the entire body of
law governing such cases rather than the indeterminacy of particular legal issues.
Moreover, because the distribution of legal issues among the cases remains unknown, the
dissent frequencies are weighted according to the frequency with which particular issues
arise. Finally, each dissent frequency reflects not only the indeterminacy of the
substantive law governing cases from each tribunal, but also contributions from
procedural and other matters at both the originating tribunal and the Federal Circuit.127
Within these limitations, we may represent the dissent frequencies of Table 2 as
relative indeterminacy ratios, Ix/Iy, by choosing one of the legal regimes as the comparator

Iy. The choice of comparator is arbitrary; Table 4 reports the indeterminacy ratios using
for Iy either the Federal Circuit's total aggregate dissent frequency, or the dissent
frequency in patent cases from the district courts.
TABLE 4: FEDERAL CIRCUIT INDETERMINACY RATIOS, 1983-2005
Originating Tribunal Normalized to all cases Normalized to District Court
patent cases
BCA

1.10

0.65

CIT

1.91

1.12

CFC

1.35

0.80

CAVC

0.89

0.52

District Courts

1.75

1.03

District Court Patent

1.70

(1.00)

DVA

1.25

0.74

ITC

0.68

0.40

MSPB

0.33

0.20

PTO

1.36

0.80

(1.00)

0.59

1.47

0.87

All Cases
All Cases No MSPB

The indeterminacy ratios vary over an approximately six-fold range, from the low
of MSPB cases to the high of the CIT cases, or approximately four-fold if we exclude the
127

For example, these statistics include opinions and dissents arising from motion practice before the
Federal Circuit.
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MSPB cases and define the ITC cases at the bottom of the range. Based on the
indeterminacy ration, the indeterminacy of patent infringement actions appears
approximately equal to that of cases appealed from the Court of International Trade;
slightly greater than that of appeals originating from the Patent and Trademark Office,
Court of Federal Claims, and Department of Veterans Affairs; somewhat greater than
appeals from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the International Trade
Commission; and notably greater than appeals from the Merit System Protection Board.
A basic statistical analysis (the chi-squared test) of the distribution of dissent
frequencies showed that the distribution of dissents was highly non-random, both over
128
129
time and between the originating tribunals. We may therefore conclude confidently

that the frequency of dissent in Federal Circuit opinions depends on the originating
tribunal, and the year in which the court decided the appeal. However, this basic test tells
us only that the overall distribution of dissents differs from that expected by chance; it
does not tell us which tribunal or which years are responsible for that difference.
To assess the contribution of tribunal and year to the observed dissent
frequencies, more complex statistical techniques are required. Logistic regression (an
analogue of linear regression) may be used to model processes in which several
underlying variables contribute to the probability of a dichotomous outcome130, and has
been frequently employed to analyze the influence of case or judge characteristics on the
probability of dissent.131 I modeled dissent at the Federal Circuit as a process in which the
probability of dissent is influenced by two independent factors: a time-independent
parameter representing the originating tribunal, and a time-dependent parameter which
takes on the value of each year of this study.132 Omitted from the analysis are opinions
originating from the Department of Veterans Affairs, the International Trade
Commission, and the Senate Select Committee, on account of the small number of cases
originating from these tribunals.

128

Pearson's moment 107.0, p < 0.0001.
Pearson's moment 263.7, p < 0.0001
130
I.e., where the outcome is described as a binary choice (dissent/unanimous; alive/dead ; etc.) rather than
a continuous measurement (such as height or weight).
131
See, e.g., Isaac Unah, The Incidence and Structure of Conflict on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 23 Law & Policy 69, 85-86 (2001); Hettinger at 83-84.
132
Both parameters are nominal, meaning that there is no order or relationship between values of each
parameter. "2004" is simply a category of cases and has no particular relationship with "2003" or "2005" or
any other year.
129
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A model incorporating tribunal and year as contributors to the probability of
dissent fit the data well, was superior in fit to a model based on tribunal alone or year
alone, and the effect of both tribunal and year was significant in the model.

133

The

estimates for each parameter in the model are shown in Table 5, along with the p-value
for the Wald chi-squared statistic for each parameter.
TABLE 5: TWO-VARIABLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF FEDERAL
CIRCUIT DISSENT FREQUENCIES
Parameter Estimate

p-value (Wald chisquared)

Tribunal[BCA]

0.03

0.8574

Tribunal[CAVC]

-0.29

0.1249

Tribunal[CFC]

0.21

0.0299*

Tribunal[CIT]

0.55

< 0.0001*

Tribunal[DCt Patent]

0.43

< 0.0001*

Tribunal[MSPB]

-1.18

<0.0001*

Tribunal[PTO]

0.26

0.0352*

Year[1983]

0.62

0.0079*

Term

Year[1984]

0.18

0.3855

Year[1985]

-0.50

0.0346*

Year[1986]

-0.60

0.0113*

Year[1987]

0.06

0.7941

Year[1988]

0.28

0.1359

Year[1989]

-0.21

0.3535

Year[1990]

-0.47

0.0337*

Year[1991]

-0.51

0.0244*

Year[1992]

-0.73

0.0017*

Year[1993]

-0.11

0.5447

Year[1994]

-0.15

0.4526

Year[1995]

0.39

0.0143*

Year[1996]

0.08

0.6707

Year[1997]

-0.10

0.5710

Year[1998]

0.02

0.8960

Year[1999]

0.05

0.7966

Year[2000]

-0.26

0.1823
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For the model incorporating both tribunal and year, the whole-model chi-squared value was 357.0 (p
<0.0001), and the chi-squared lack of fit test yielded p = 0.76. Models including tribunal alone or year
alone yielded lack-of-fit chi squared values with p = 0.48 and 0.45, respectively. The increase in
significance level for the single-factor models indicates that the goodness of fit was superior for the twofactor model. For the two-factor model, the chi-squared effect test statistics for tribunal and year were
247.1 (p < 0.0001) and 80.6 (p < 0.0001) respectively. In a model including a second-order term
representing the interaction of tribunal and year, the effect of the second-order term on the model was not
significant (p = 0.41).
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Year[2001]

0.06

0.7082

Year[2002]

0.53

0.0006*

Year[2003]

0.48

0.0019*

Year[2004]

0.51

0.0012*

Year[2005]

0.38

0.0696

The precise interpretation of parameter estimates from logistic regressions is
complex. For our purposes, it suffices to note that (1) the parameter estimate is related
logarithmically to the change in outcome odds, and (2) the change in odds is relative to
the mean dissent frequency for all observations, in this case the overall dissent frequency
of 4.21% for the tribunals modeled. A positive parameter estimate indicates that this
parameter is associated with increased odds of dissent relative to the mean, and a
negative parameter is associated with decreased odds of dissent relative to the mean.
Statistically significant parameters indicate that it is unlikely that the observed
frequencies are a result of chance rather than an effect of the parameter on the probability
of dissent.
The regression model yielded positive and significant parameters for the Court of
Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, the district courts, and the Patent and
Trademark Office, indicating that origin of a case from these tribunals significantly
increases the probability of dissent relative to the mean. In contrast, the negative and
significant parameter associated with appeals originating from the Merit Systems
Protection Board demonstrates that such origin significantly decreases the likelihood of
dissent relative to the mean.
To compare specifically the likelihood of dissent in patent cases with other cases,
we may perform pairwise contrast tests of the logistic regression model. These tests
predict according to the regression model the change in the odds of dissent if we change
the originating tribunal from one category to another. Table 6 compares the odds of
dissent if the case is a patent case originating from the district courts, with the odds of
dissent if the case originated from each of the other tribunals, and reports the significance
of these odds ratios.
TABLE 6: RATIOS OF DISSENT ODDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES TO
DISSENT ODDS IN OTHER CASES, 1983-2005
BCA
Pairwise Logit

CAVC
0.40

0.72

CFC

CIT
0.22
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PTO
-0.12

MSPB
0.17

1.61

Contrast
Predicted Odds
Ratio
p-value

1.50

2.06

1.25

0.89

1.18

5.02

0.0169*

0.0007*

0.0440*

0.4336

0.2366

<0.0001*

The odds ratio shows the logistic model's prediction for the change in odds if the
case changes from the indicated tribunal to a patent case from the district courts. Thus,
the model predicts that the odds of dissent are 5.02 times greater in a patent case than in a
MSPB cases, 2.06 times greater in a patent case than in a CAVC case, etc. The odds
ratios predicted by logistic regression correspond closely with those determined simply
from the ratios of the observed dissent frequencies,134 reflecting the close fit of the model
to the observed data. More usefully, the significance levels associated with each ratio
permit us to draw firm conclusions about the indeterminacy of patent cases compared to
the indeterminacy of other cases resolved by the Federal Circuit. Appeals of patent
infringement actions are significantly more indeterminate than those originating from the
Boards of Contract Appeals, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Court of
Federal Claims, or the Merit Systems Protection Board. We cannot state whether patent
infringement cases differ in indeterminacy from those originating from the Court of
International Trade or the Patent and Trademark Office.
Returning to the parameters derived from the logistic regression model, Table 5
shows that the years 1983, 1995, and 2002-2004, and (marginally) 2005 were associated
with probabilities of dissent increased relative to the mean, while 1985-1986 and 19901992 were associated with decreased probabilities of dissent. This analysis cannot
resolve whether the time-dependent changes in the probability of dissent resulted from
changes in the indeterminacy of cases decided by the Federal Circuit, or changes in the
structural variables that suppress or provoke dissent at the court. Dissent frequencies rose
across several categories of cases commencing in 2002, as shown in Table 2. This
coordinated increase might indicate that Circuit-wide norms restraining the expression of
dissent began to deteriorate in 2002, i.e. that the Federal Circuit's structural parameter SC
began to increase at that time. But it is also possible that the increase in dissent reflects

134

The reciprocal of the odds ratios are: 0.67 (BCA); 0.49 (CAVC); 0.80 (CFC); 1.13 (CIT); 0.85 (PTO);
0.20 (MSPB). These correspond closely to the tribunal dissent frequencies normalized to the district court
dissent frequency shown in Table 4.
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not changes in structural parameters but coincident increases in indeterminacy across
several categories of cases.

Reversal and Dissent
Studies of the Circuit Courts of Appeal report a strong association between
reversal of the district court and dissent on the appellate court.

135

This association has

been ascribed to the effect of legal indeterminacy, because both trial and appellate judges
are observers of the case who may disagree when legal principles only weakly constrain
outcomes.136 Although this study did not measure the frequency of dissent with respect to
individual case reversals or affirmances, we may compare the rates of Federal Circuit
dissent and Federal Circuit reversal between tribunals to gauge the overall correlation
between reversal and dissent. I derived tribunal reversal rates, for a period nearly
coincident with this study, from data compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
137

Courts.

Table 7 shows the comparative reversal and dissent proportions, and the

number of dissents per reversal, for the tribunals having significant numbers of dissents
and reversals,138 as well as the total for all tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
TABLE 7: COMPARATIVE REVERSAL AND DISSENT RATES BY TRIBUNAL,
1997-2005
BCA
Reversals
FY1997-FY2005

CIT

13.9%

CFC
22.1%

CAVC
20.8%

District
Courts

14.1%

17.2%

MSPB

All
Tribunals

PTO
5.8%

11.4%

13.8%
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Richardson and Vines, The Politics of Federal Courts(1970), at 136-35; Hettinger et al (2006), 66-71.
Hettinger et al, at 59.
137
Judicial Business, Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html). The Administrative Office reports in Table B-8 of each
report the number of appeals terminated by judges (versus by staff) and the percentage of cases reversed by
tribunal for each fiscal year. The number of cases for each tribunal reversed for each year was derived
from the number of the appeals and the reversal rate, and summed from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2005
to determine the reversal rate over that period. Because the statistics are reported by fiscal year, the dataset
defined by the Administrative Office reports covers an additional three months both prior and following the
portion of this study used for comparison (October 1, 1996 - December 31, 1996 and July 1, 2005 September 30, 2005). It seems unlikely that inclusion of this period would yield reversal rates significantly
different from those computed for January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2005.
138
The standard errors computed for each proportion and ratio in Table 7 were:
136

BCA CIT
Dissents 1.11% 1.74%
Reversal
s
1.92% 1.80%
Ratio
0.09
0.09

CFC
0.80%

District
CAVC Courts MSPB
0.92% 0.63% 0.31%

PTO
1.23%

All
tribunals
0.28%

1.15%
0.04

1.13%
0.07

1.48%
0.13

0.36%
0.02

0.69%
0.04

0.44%
0.06

Errors of the reversal and dissent proportions are reported as percentages because Table 7 reports those
proportions as percentages; they do not represent error as a percentage of the values reported in Table 7.
These errors are not corrected for the correlation between dissent and reversal, which would reduce the
magnitude of the standard errors.
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Dissents 19972005
Dissents:
Reversals

3.6%
0.26

10.9%
0.49

6.3%
0.30

4.0%
0.28

8.1%
0.47

2.0%
0.35

5.8%
0.51

5.3%
0.39

Because the dataset of this study and the dataset maintained by the Administrative
Office were not compiled with identical inclusion criteria, the absolute value of the ratio
of dissents to reversals for a particular tribunal has little meaning.139 Comparisons

between tribunals are meaningful, because the methodology of both datasets is constant
over the set of tribunals. A relatively low ratio of dissents to reversals marks categories
of cases that the appellate court considered "easy," in the sense that they did not provoke
disagreement within the court, but where the originating tribunal more frequently reached
the wrong conclusion (at least according to the Federal Circuit). Higher ratios mark
regimes in which issues provoking disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the
originating tribunal also provoked disagreement within the appellate court.
Legal indeterminacy ought to increase both disagreement between the originating
tribunal and the Federal Circuit, and between the judges of the Federal Circuit.
Therefore, variations in indeterminacy between each legal regime represented in Table 7
will increase or decrease the percentage of reversals and dissents, but should not affect
the ratio of dissents to reversals. If the effect of legal indeterminacy on dissents and
reversals is constant within each regime, we would expect more disagreement between
the originating tribunal and the appellate panel either where the policy preferences of the
appellate judges differ from those of the originating tribunal, or where the two bodies
differ in their ability to discern the "correct" outcome of the case. We would thus expect
a high ratio of dissents to reversals where the viewpoint or capability of the originating
tribunal approaches that of the Federal Circuit, and low ratios where the viewpoint or
capability of the originating tribunal diverges from that of the Federal Circuit.
Table 7 shows that rates of reversal and dissent are well-correlated.

140

Although

the rates of reversal and dissent vary over a 4- to 5-fold range, with a low at the Merit
139

Nonetheless, the ratio across all tribunals from 1997-2005, 0.39, is similar to that derived from the
database of all the cases of the regional Circuit Courts of Appeal described in Songer et al (2000). For
1970-1988, the last time period of the database, Songer et al. report a dissent rate of 9.43%, and a reversal
rate of 30.83%. Songer et al., Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals (2000), at
105. The ratio computed from these rates is 0.31. Discrepancies between the Songer et al. dataset (which
was limited to reported decisions) and the datasets of this study, and of the Administrative Office, counsel
against drawing conclusions from this comparison.
140
Pearson's r= 0.82; p < 0.05.
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Systems Protection Board and a high at the Court of International Trade, the ratio of
dissent to reversal remains relatively constant, varying over only a 2-fold range. This
correlation suggests that the originating and appellate tribunals have broadly similar
policy preferences and competencies, and variation in dissent rates and reversal rates
between tribunals tracks variations in the indeterminacy of the law.
The high correlation between reversal and dissents means that the differences in
the dissent to reversal ratio between tribunals are not especially significant. Moreover,
over a short time interval, the ratio for any one tribunal will be significantly depressed if
the Federal Circuit announces a new precedent which triggers many reversals in its
immediate wake. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the district courts score high,
indicating a relatively good correspondence between preferences or capabilities of the
district courts and those of the Federal Circuit. The district courts' ratio is exceeded,
marginally, by the Patent and Trademark Office and the Court of International Trade, but
is otherwise higher than the other specialized tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
Statistical comparison of the district courts' dissent: reversal ratio to those of the other
tribunals showed that the ratio computed for the district courts is significantly higher than
that computed for the BCA, CFC, CAVC and (marginally) the MSPB, but not
significantly different from the other tribunals.

V.

141

INDETERMINACY IN PATENT LITIGATION

Indeterminacy of Patent Cases in General
Classifying cases by originating tribunal facilitates comparison between regimes,
but it obscures more than might be supposed. The opinions contain not only opinions
resolving substantive or procedural issues in an appeal, but also miscellaneous orders and
opinions related to Federal Circuit appellate practice and jurisdiction, as well as petitions
for rehearing or the issuance of writs. If we are interested in the indeterminacy of the
underlying body of law governing case outcomes, we must restrict our consideration to
those opinions addressing outcomes. To do so, we must obtain a dataset consisting only
of patent cases at the Federal Circuit originating in the district courts. This category is
141

A z-score for the difference in ratios between the district courts and each other tribunal was computed
from the standard errors of the ratios. The z-scores were 2.23* (BCA), -0.20 (CFC), 2.95* (CFC), 2.33*
(CAVC), 1.68 (MSPB) and -0.30 (PTO). The difference between the district court ratio and the MSPB
ratio became significant if the standard errors of the ratios was corrected for the correlation between
dissents and reversals.
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comprised almost entirely of actions for patent infringement, or for declaratory judgment
of noninfringement.

142

The initial dataset comprised all published and unpublished

decisions of the Federal Circuit for the period extending from January 1st, 1983, to June
30th, 2005. En banc cases and summary affirmances were excluded. To more
specifically assess the degree to which the legal regime constrains decision-making in
patent cases, opinions devoted solely to petitions were also excluded from the dataset.143
Like other federal appellate courts,144 the Federal Circuit operates at its own discretion in
145
granting petitions, and these opinions do not provide an opportunity to assess the

constraining effect of statute or precedent.
To accurately determine the number of appeals in patent actions originating in the
district courts,146 I employed an iterative textual screen of the LEXIS Federal Circuit
databases, filtering the results with various search parameters and manually reviewing the
included and excluded cases to correct for textual anomalies and database encoding
errors.147 The final dataset comprised 2,364 opinions resolving patent infringement
appeals for the period extending from 1983 through the first six months of 2005. I then
employed a similar strategy to recover all opinions in the dataset containing a dissenting
142

A very small number of cases are appeals from litigants challenging a decision of the Patent and
Trademark Office by means of a civil action under 35 U.S.C §§ 145, 146, or 154(b)(4)(A).
143
This category includes primarily petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, with a small
number of petitions for a writ of mandamus and a smaller number of miscellaneous petitions. It includes
the relatively small number of issued opinions that address motions made before the Federal Circuit.
Some of these opinions address procedural issues (e.g., motions to dismiss an appeal for lack of a final
judgment), while others deal with matters of Federal Circuit practice (e.g., motions to strike a portion of an
opponent's brief for failure to comply with Federal Circuit rules).
144
See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997).
145
In re United States, __ F.3d ___ (Fed. Cir. Sep. 11, 2006) (writ of mandamus).
146
Included in this category are cases originating in a district court but arriving again at the Federal Circuit
on remand from the Supreme Court. Excluded are district court cases that do not represent patent
infringement actions, such as money claims against the United States brought under the Little Tucker Act.
147
I began by searching the LEXIS CAFC database with the search terms "POSTURE (court /5 district) or
HISTORY (court /5 district)" and appropriate date restrictions to define a preliminary of district court cases
(4,084 opinions for all years). I then filtered this set with the search term "patent" to exclude cases
definitively having no connection to patent law (2,744 opinions). From this set, I defined a preliminary
subsets of opinions resolving patent cases by excluding petitions ("not(DISPOSITION(petition) or
DISPOSITION(rehearing))"; 2,587 opinions) and further requiring the word "patent" in the LEXIS CORETERM field ("core-terms(patent)"; 2,261 opinions). From this set I subtracted en banc cases according to
the date-specific four-judge exclusion method described in Part IV (2,240 opinions). I then, by manual
review of the included and excluded opinions at each filtering step, corrected this dataset for the following
errors and ambiguities in the LEXIS fields: opinions with "petition" or "rehearing" in the DISPOSITION
field not actually addressing petitions; opinions lacking "petition" or "rehearing" in the DISPOSITION
field but solely addressing a petition; patent infringement appeals lacking the word "patent" in the CORETERMS field, and appeals originating from a district court but failing the POSTURE or HISTORY criteria
described above. The great majority of such anomalies were opinions in patent appeals where the LEXIS
CORE-TERMS field failed to include the word "patent."
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opinion,148 yielding a final total of 250panel dissents. The incidence of dissent in all
appeals of patent infringement actions originating in the district courts and resolved by
three-judge panels of the Federal Circuit is shown in Table 8.

148

Because of inconsistencies in the LEXIS databases, I defined separate, overlapping subsets of dissenting
opinions by limiting the dataset to opinions with the word root "dissent" in the JUDGES field
("JUDGES("dissent!")), and by limiting the dataset to opinions with any judge who has served on the
Federal Circuit in the DISSENTBY field. I then corrected the small number of instances where dissenting
opinions were not coded in either the JUDGES or DISSENTBY field, by manually reviewing each case
that failed the above criteria but nonetheless contained the word root "dissent" in the opinion text.
("dissent!").
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TABLE 8: DISSENT FREQUENCIES IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS,
1983-2005
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
(Jan- Jun)
TOTAL

Appeals of Patent
Dissents
Infringement Actions
37
89
65
68
64
62
55
68
80
75
84
79
103
128
138
133
146
142
177
155
163
151

4
9
9
3
8
9
7
1
3
5
9
6
19
14
8
12
14
10
17
20
25
28

Dissent Frequency
10.81%
10.11%
13.85%
4.41%
12.50%
14.52%
12.73%
1.47% *
3.75% *
6.67%
10.71%
7.59%
18.45% *
10.94%
5.80%
9.02%
9.59%
7.04%
9.60%
12.90%
15.34% *
18.54% *

101

10

9.90%

2363

250

10.58%

Logistic regression analysis149, as described above for the analysis of tribunal data,
but with a single independent variable representing year, suggested that the decreased
dissent frequencies observed in 1990 and 1991, and the increased dissent frequencies
observed in 1995, 2003 and 2004, were statistically significant differences from the mean
dissent frequency.150 These minima and maxima are suggestive of fluctuations in the
indeterminacy of the substantive legal regime governing patent cases, but as with the

149

Whole model difference chi-squared 47.13, p = 0.0014; lack-of-fit chi square 2363.00, p = 0.3651.
Parameter estimates and associated significance levels were for 1990: -1.92, p =0.0045; 1992: -0.95, p =
0.05; 1995: 0.80, p = 0.0039; 2003: 0.58, p = 0.0146; 2004: 0.81, p = 0.0005.
150
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comparison of tribunal dissent frequencies, this analysis cannot resolve fluctuations in
legal indeterminacy from fluctuations in Circuit-wide norms of dissent.
The dissent frequencies reported in Table 5 provide a more accurate measure of
the incidence of dissent in patent cases than do the statistics of Tables 1 to 4, because the
filtration process limits the dataset to opinions actually resolving disputed patent cases.
These statistics are nonetheless still crude: they reflect a weighted aggregate of all
substantive, procedural, and non-patent issues arising in patent litigation, and we lack an
appropriate comparator to assess the relative indeterminacy of the patent litigation
regime to another legal regime. To overcome these limitations, we must disaggregate the
issues presented in patent litigation and determine to what extent the legal regime
constrains their decision.

Indeterminacy of Claim Construction and Other Patent Issues
To accurately assess the indeterminacy of the legal issues governing patent
appeals, we must define "legal issue" at a level below that of the individual case.
Following the approach of Chu,151 the following five groupings of legal issues that appear
in patent infringement cases were defined: claim construction, infringement, invalidity,152
inequitable conduct, and all other issues. The last category, "other," is a catch-all
category including not only patent issues other than the listed categories, but also issues
of procedure and jurisdiction, as well as any non-patent substantive issue appearing in a
patent case.153
The relative indeterminacy of particular patent law issues in the interval between

Cybor and Phillips was assessed by examining every reported and unreported opinion of
the Federal Circuit, in patent appeals originating at the district courts, from 1998 through
the first six months of 2005, that contained a dissenting opinion. Each opinion was
scored according to the issue or combination of issues addressed by the dissenting
opinion. The results are shown in Table 9.

154

TABLE 9: DISSENTS BY ISSUE IN PATENT CASES, 1998-2005
151

Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 Berk. Tech.
L. J. 1075, 1137-38 (2001).
152
Included within this category are any decisions assessing the validity of a patent against the statutory
requirements for patentability, as well as judge-made doctrines such as certain forms of double patenting.
153
E.g., antitrust, contract, and trademark or copyright infringement claims.
154
Some dissenting opinions disagree with the majority on more than one issue; hence, the number of
dissents on each issue combined exceeds the total number of dissenting opinions
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Year

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
(Jan Jun)
Total

Dissents
addressing
other issues

Total
Dissents

2
1
2
5
10
5
4
1

Dissents
addressing
inequitable
conduct
2
0
1
1
1
2
1
0

8
7
3
9
6
10
8
6

12
14
10
17
20
25
28
10

30

8

57

136

Dissents
addressing
claim
construction
1
4
4
7
6
9
16
4

Dissents
addressing
infringement

Dissents
addressing
invalidity

4
6
3
4
3
8
10
0

51

38

To derive issue dissent frequencies from the dissent counts, it is necessary to
estimate the number of cases in the dataset in which the tabulated issues were presented.
Without this denominator, issue dissent frequencies would be skewed by the frequency
with which the issues appeared in the cases. I determined the number of opinions
addressing claim construction in the district court patent case dataset by a combination of
text-based search and manual review of the entire dataset.155 For the remaining
categories, I obtained the frequency of issues in Federal Circuit appeals from the earlier
study of Chu156 and by manual review of a sample of the dataset.157 The frequencies with
155

I screened the district court dataset with the search "claim! w/5 (construction or construing or construe!
or interpret!)" to obtain an initial dataset of 755 total cases. I then manually reviewed the resulting
opinions to determine whether the opinion (majority, concurring, or dissenting) addressed any issue
requiring the court to determine the scope of a patent's claim. Opinions were classified as addressing claim
construction if the court considered the merits of the claim construction from the lower court. Included in
this category are considerations of whether the district court’s claim construction was sufficiently thorough,
questions of compliance with § 112, p. 2 if determination required the court to interpret the claim language,
classification and construction of claims drawn according to § 112, p. 6, and opinions addressing the effect
of prosecution history estoppel if determination required the court to interpret the claim language.
Opinions were not considered to address claim construction if the appellate court merely noted that the
issue of claim construction was moot or waived, or if the court otherwise declined to address the lower
court’s claim construction. These criteria are significantly broader than that employed by Wagner and
Petherbridge (Penn L. Rev), who scored an opinion only if the discussion of claim interpretation was
sufficiently comprehensive to be classified according to the methodologies of claim construction proposed
in their paper. Wagner and Petherbridge report 513 opinions for the period of this study, as compared to
the 614 recovered by the broader criteria.
156
Chu, 16 BERKTLJ 1075 (2001) Table G-1.
157
Data for 1998 and 1999 were taken directly from the set of all Federal Circuit opinions compiled by Chu,
id. For 2000 through June 2005, I generated a random sample of reported and unreported opinions from
the dataset and reviewed each case in the sample to determine which issues it addressed. The sample size
was 50 cases for 2000-2004, and 40 cases for the first six months of 2005. Because claim construction was
scored both in the review of the entire dataset, and in the review of the samples, we may assess the
precision of sampling by comparing the actual number of claim construction cases and the number
estimated from the sampling. For the period 2000-2005, the distribution by year of actual and estimated
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which issues were addressed in reported and unreported patent opinions of the Federal
Circuit are shown in Table 10.
TABLE 10: PATENT ISSUE INCIDENCE FREQUENCIES, 1998-2005
Inequitable
Claim
construction Infringement Invalidity conduct
Other
1998
52%
50%
31%
10%
1999
49%
54%
36%
10%
2000
51%
50%
28%
6%
2001
57%
32%
42%
8%
2002
52%
38%
34%
6%
2003
63%
58%
34%
10%
2004
54%
36%
26%
6%
2005 (Jan-Jun)
34%
23%
33%
10%

58%
49%
50%
50%
56%
42%
60%
65%

1998-2005

53%

51%

46%

33%

9%

From the incidence of dissent on each issue, and the frequency with which each
issue was addressed in Federal Circuit decisions, I determined the frequency with which
each issue provoked dissent in reported and unreported opinions of the Federal Circuit for
each year of this study. I then compared the dissent frequency associated with each issue
to the dissent frequency associated with claim construction to obtain Ix/Iinterp, the relative
indeterminacy of each issue as compared to the indeterminacy of claim construction.
Table 11 shows the results.
TABLE 11: PATENT ISSUE DISSENT FREQUENCIES, 1998-2005
Inequitable
Claim
Other
construction InfringementInvalidity conduct
1998
1.4%
6.0%
4.8%
15.6%
10.4%
1999
5.6%
7.6%
1.9%
0.0%
9.8%
2000
5.5%
4.2%
5.0%
11.7%
4.2%
2001
6.9%
7.1%
6.7%
7.1%
10.2%
2002
7.5%
5.1%
19.0%*
10.8%
6.9%
2003
8.7%
8.5%
9.0%
12.3%
14.6%
2004
19.5%*
18.4%*
10.2%
11.0%
8.8%
2005 (J-J)
11.8%
0.0%
3.0%
0.0%
9.1%
Total

8.3%

7.5%

7.7%

8.5%

9.2%

claim constructed cases corresponded closely. A two-sample chi-squared test did not support the
hypothesis that the distributions were different (chi-squared = 6.0; p = 0.55).
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Ix/Iinterp

(1.00)

0.91

0.93

1.02

1.11

Table 11 shows that, over the period extending from January of 1998 through
June of 2005, claim construction provoked dissent at the Federal Circuit at a frequency
nearly identical to infringement, invalidity, inequitable conduct, or other issues: the
value of Ix/Iinterp is very nearly 1 for each of the issues examined. The differences observed
between total issue dissent frequencies were not at all statistically significant.158 In other
words, there is no support for the hypothesis that, over the entire period of this study,
claim construction was any more or less indeterminate than any other issue of patent law.
Admittedly, the resolution of this analysis is not precise: groupings such as "invalidity"
or "other" mask many different sub-issues of undoubtedly varying determinacy.
Furthermore, the frequency of dissent on claim construction should show some degree of
correlation with the frequency of dissent on infringement and invalidity issues, because
patent infringement and patent validity both depend on the scope of the patent's claims.159
Nonetheless, within the bounds of these issue definitions, the data presented here provide
for the first time an accurate measure of the indeterminacy of the legal regime governing
patent infringement litigation. These data suggest that between 1998 and 2005, the
general categories of legal issues resolved by the Federal Circuit in patent litigation have
been characterized by approximately the same degree of legal indeterminacy.
That said, the data may support the hypothesis that dissent frequencies at the
Federal Circuit have changed over time within the period of this study. The distribution
of dissent frequencies for claim construction and invalidity over time differs significantly
from that expected by chance, and differs marginally significantly for infringement.160
For inequitable conduct and other issues, the hypothesis that the distribution over time
differed from that expected by chance was not supported. To explore the possibility that
the significant fluctuations in dissent frequencies over time reflected a real change in the

158

A two-sample chi-squared test yielded p = 0.87.
Not all determinations of infringement or invalidity involve disputes over claim construction. There may
be no disagreement about the scope of the claims, or the resolution of an invalidity issue may be the same
regardless of which party's claim construction argument prevails.
160
Chi-squared values by Pearson's moment test were claim construction: 18.9, p = 0.008; infringement:
13.2, p = 0.07; invalidity: 14.1, p= 0.05; inequitable conduct: 3.6, p = 0.82; other issues: 5.4, p = 0.61.
159
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probability of dissent, I constructed for each issue independent161 logistic regression
models of dissent as a function of a single nominal variable, representing a parameter
specific to each year. The models showed statistically significant, positive effects on the
odds of dissent relative to the mean for 2002 with respect to invalidity,

162

and for 2004

with respect to claim construction163 and infringement.164 For claim construction (but not
other issues), the data also fit a model in which the odds of dissent increased modestly,
but significantly, for each year from 1998 to 2005;165 these results are consistent with
outcome-based studies suggesting increasing disparity in the Federal Circuit's claim
construction methodology over time.

166

Because time-dependent increases in dissent

probability appear for some issues but not others, the data may suggest that the increases
in dissent observed for 2002 and 2004 are accounted for by an increase in issue-specific
legal indeterminacy around those years, rather than an increase in the Circuit-wide
structural parameter SC.167
There seems no clear factor to account for the increased incidence of dissents on
invalidity issues during 2002, other than the observation that the Federal Circuit decided
several significant and controversial cases on validity issues in 2002: the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the invalidity of patents anticipated by an
inherent disclosure in the prior art, and prosecution laches (the effect of an applicant's
untoward delay in pursuing her application before the Patent and Trademark Office).168
161

We cannot assume that dissent on each issue is independent within each case, so it is not permissible to
construct a single model. Obviously, dissent on claim construction will be correlated with dissent on
infringement and invalidity because whether or not claims are valid and infringed depends on their scope.
162
Whole-model chi-squared 13.1, p = 0.07; Year(2004) chi squared 9.6, p = 0.002.
163
Whole-model chi-squared 18.5, p = 0.01; Year(2004) chi squared 11.8, p = 0.0006.
164
Whole-model chi-squared 12.7, p = 0.08; Year(2004) chi squared 11.8, p = 0.0009. The whole-model
chi-squared implies that the entire model is significant only at the 92% level, not the 95% level.
165
Treating the year of decision as a continuous variable yielded a model with a value of 0.27 for the year
parameter, corresponding to an increase in the odds ratio (not probability) of dissent of 1.3:1 each year. For
this model, the whole-model and year parameter chi-squared fit was 13.1, p = 0.0003. Obviously, such a
model cannot be extended indefinitely in time, as it predicts that the probability of dissent would eventually
approach 100%.
166
See Wagner and Petherbridge, 152 Penn. L. Rev. 1105, 1151 (2004) (finding that proportion of "strong"
methodologies increased in claim construction opinions from 1996 to 2002).
167
but see Part VI infra, on the effect of normalizing the claim construction dissent frequency to the Federal
Circuit's non-interpretation dissent frequency.
168
Enzo (written description); Elan (inherency); Symbol-Tech (prosecution laches). Otherwise, the
invalidity dissents of 2002 are notable only for the frequency with which (then-Chief) Judge Mayer
dissented from rulings overturning jury verdicts holding patents invalid. 3M; Juicy Whip (anticipation);
Union Carbide (enablement). Lest the reader develop the impression that Judge Mayer was hostile to
patents during 2002, Judge Mayer's other dissent on invalidity during 2002 would have sustained the
district court's pre-verdict grant of JMOL in favor of the patentee.
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The increase in dissents on claim construction issues in 2004 certainly may explain why
the Federal Circuit granted en banc review in Phillips in mid-2004; the significant
increase in dissent frequency would convey the impression that claim construction was
becoming more contentious. But there is no obvious explanation why claim construction
provoked more disagreement at the Federal Circuit in 2004. Examination of claim
construction dissents from 1998 to 2005 revealed no patterns other than small increases
in the proportion of dissents on the proper role of dictionaries and other extrinsic
evidence. The increase may be attributable in part to disagreements over dictionaries in
the wake of Texas Digital and its progeny, a line of cases heavily emphasizing technical
dictionaries as a source of meaning in claim construction.169 Certainly the Federal Circuit
felt so: the court took special care to disapprove of Texas Digital and its progeny in its en
banc opinion in Phillips. 170 We might further speculate that the apparent drop in dissent
frequency in the first half of 2005 reflected consensus among Federal Circuit judges that
disputes over claim construction should be put on hold until the court issued its opinion
in Phillips. However, the relatively small number of claim construction dissents renders
all such explanations little more than speculation. With so few dissents, it is difficult to
establish whether there was any meaningful increase or trend in disagreements over
specific claim construction issues over the period of this study, or whether the increase in
disagreements that apparently sparked en banc review in Phillips represented the
culmination of a long-term trend or merely an effect peculiar to 2004.
VI.

COMPARING INTERPRETIVE REGIMES

Measuring Contract Interpretation Indeterminacy
There is little or no evidence that claim construction is less determinate than other
aspects of patent law. Nonetheless, we might ask how claim construction compares
against other interpretive regimes. Some of the indeterminacy in claim construction
cases may stem from the particular framework of interpretation erected by the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit. But part of the observed indeterminacy may also arise
from the difficulties inherent in linguistic interpretation. To fairly assess how well the
claim construction regime operates at the appellate level, the relevant question might be

169
170

Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
*cite
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not how claim construction compares to other aspects of patent law, but how claim
construction compares to other interpretive regimes that must also grapple with the
ambiguities of language.

171

To assess the relative indeterminacy of interpretive regimes, I compared the
interpretation of patent claims at Federal Circuit with the interpretation of contracts at the
regional United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Circuit Courts of Appeals,
obviously, are nearest to the Federal Circuit in the character of the judges, procedure,
number of cases resolved, and other parameters that might influence the incidence of
dissent. The choice of contract interpretation as the regime to compare claim
interpretation against rests on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretical,
because while the effect of a patent - to establish rights good against the world - may be
more akin to a statute than a contract,172 in their diversity of subject matter and authorship
patents resemble contracts more than they do legislation.

173

Practical, because it is

feasible to design relatively simple text-based strategies to recover the entire set contract
interpretation cases decided by the Circuit Courts of Appeal; statutory interpretation
arises in so many different contexts that the definition and isolation of all statutory
interpretation cases may be impossible by textual screening.174
I began the assessment of indeterminacy in contract interpretation by measuring
the frequency of dissents in reported and unreported opinions addressing the
interpretation of contracts at each of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals for the years
1998 to 2003. The dataset for this study was defined by first employing a text-based
search algorithm,175 and subsequent manual screening to identify opinions in which the
171

Of course, nearly every conceivable legal determination requires interpretation of some text.
*Markman/Cybor
173
Patent claims emerge, like contracts, from a process of negotiation between two parties: the patent
applicant and an examiner at the Patent and Trademark Office. Patent claims may attempt to capture in
language any tangible or intangible process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. This
diversity is comparable to contract language, which may attempt to capture all human economic behavior
or any other relationship between persons and entities. The subject matter of statute is somewhat smaller,
defining the rights and duties of citizens and the operation of government. For comparison, there have been
more than seven million patents, usually with multiple claims, issued in the United States last two hundred
years - a figure no doubt dwarfed by the number of contracts drafted in the same period, but exceeding the
number of statutes.
174
Where agency action is involved, statutory interpretation is further complicated by the question of
deference to agency interpretations.
175
The LEXIS Courts of Appeals databases were screened with the query "contract /s interpret! or constru!
or ambigu! or defin! or mean! & not plea agreement or maritime or consent decree or name(United
States)." The optimal search algorithm was developed by first obtaining a relatively complete population
of cases addressing contract interpretation for defined time periods from two different courts, and then
172
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Courts of Appeals considered the interpretation of a contract between private parties.176
Given the more varied contexts in which contract interpretation issues may arise,
classifying a case as one involving contract interpretation vel non necessarily involves
more subjectivity than classifying a case as one involving claim construction.177
Table 12 reports the number of cases recovered by the textual screen, the number
of cases determined to address contract interpretation issues, and the incidence of dissent
on contract interpretation issues. Table 12 also shows the frequency of dissent on issues
other than contract interpretation, in contract interpretation cases.
TABLE 12: CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND DISSENTS AT THE CIRCUIT
COURTS OF APPEAL, 1998-2003
Circuit

Cases Screened Contract Interpretation Cases Contract Interpretation DissentsOther Dissents Contract Interpretation Dissen

1

245

80

0

2

2

382

142

6

2

3

250

98

6

2

4

318

133

16

7

5

325

120

5

4

6

474

172

11

4

7

494

170

7

0

8

346

147

7

1

9

733

249

22

8

10

383

130

5

2

11

222

79

3

1

DC

245

14

0

0

Federal

204

27

3

1

testing search algorithms against the set of all contract interpretation cases to ascertain which search
algorithm best identified all the interpretation cases with the fewest number of "false positive" results. To
obtain a relatively complete population of cases addressing contract interpretation , I recovered every
opinion containing the word "contract" in three-month periods from the Second Circuit (7/1/1999 9/30/1999, 92 cases) and the Ninth Circuit (1/1/2003 - 3/31/2003, 108 cases) and manually screened these
cases to establish which ones addressed contract interpretation. Several dozen different text-based search
algorithms were then tested against the relatively complete population to identify which algorithm
performed best, as measured by identifying all of the known interpretation cases and the fewest noninterpretation cases.
176
Cases in which federal, state, or foreign governments or government agencies were named parties were
excluded, in part because contracts with government agencies may be subject to defined regimes of
interpretation. See, e.g., 48 CFR Ch. 1, Part 2 (defining numerous terms for use in government
contracting). To keep the dataset focused primarily on opinions in which the Court of Appeals determined
the meaning of contract language according to ordinary principles of interpretation, maritime contracts,
opinions interpreting plea agreements or agreed-to injunctions, and opinions involving the review of an
arbitrator's interpretation of a contract were also excluded.
177
Opinions were classified according to the principle that interpretation cases were ones in which the court
sought to derive intention or meaning from the language of the parties. Thus, for example, the familiar
classroom case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus , though a case deciding contract formation, would have been
classified as an interpretation case in this study because it was necessary for the court to determine the
meaning each party subjectively attached to the term "Peerless."
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TOTAL
Total exclusive of
Federal Circuit

4621

1561

91

34

4417

1534

88

33

Contract interpretation questions provoked dissent in panel opinions with an
incidence between a low no dissent at the First and DC Circuits, to a high of 12.03% at
the Fourth Circuit. The average incidence of dissent from all reported and unreported
contract interpretation cases from 1998 to 2003 was 5.83%.178 Other issues arising in
contract interpretation cases provoked dissent at lower frequencies, ranging from 0% to
5.26% with an average incidence of 2.18%.

179

Table 12 shows that dissent frequencies on matters of contract interpretation
varied considerably between the various Circuit Courts of Appeal: aside from the lack of
dissents in the First and DC Circuits, there is an approximately 3-fold variation in
interpretation dissent rates between the low Circuits (the Tenth and Eleventh) and the
high (the Fourth). Similar patterns, though not as pronounced, may be seen in the
frequency of dissent on non-interpretation issues to the extent the small number of such
dissents permits analysis.
The variation between dissent rates seen in Table 12 must reflect some
combination of differences in the determinacy of the cases presented to the court,
differences in the court structural variables that generate or suppress dissent in all cases,
and purely stochastic variation. 180 It is difficult to imagine sources of systematic variation
in the determinacy of contract interpretation cases presented to the various Circuits,
unless regional concentration of industries or variations in state law leads to regional
over- or under-representation of contracts posing difficult interpretation questions.181 It
178

Restricting the analysis to reported cases only depressed the overall dissent rate to 5.75%. This effect is
due almost entirely to the Ninth Circuit, which selected for publication only 10 of its 22 opinions
containing dissents on contract interpretation issues.
179
The higher incidence of dissent on interpretation questions, as compared to non-interpretation issues in
interpretation cases, does not support any meaningful conclusions about the relative determinacy of
contract interpretation. Aside from the low number of dissents on non-interpretation questions, the
incidence of other issues in contract interpretation is obviously highly biased towards issues that are
contested when parties litigate contract disputes. Thus, if anything, the discrepancy suggests only that
other legal issues arising from the same set of facts as contract disputes tend to be more constrained than
interpretation issues in those disputes.
180
Songer, in Goldman & Lamb, at 135.
181
For example, if oil and gas contracts tended to pose particularly difficult questions of interpretation, one
might expect more dissent on contract interpretation issues in the Fifth Circuit. Or perhaps the degree to
which the law of contract interpretation is determinant varies between states, and therefore provokes more
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seems more likely that variation in structural variables between contributes the greater
portion of variation between Circuit dissent rates.

182

Recall from Part III that the probability of dissent on a particular issue, at a
particular court C and in a case that addresses legal issue x, may be represented by the
relation Px = Ix × SC. Ix represents the indeterminacy of the legal issue of interest, and SC
represents the "extra-legal" structural variables that affect the incidence of dissent at court

C. Let us divide the legal issues considered by the court into two categories:
interpretation issues, and all other issues. The contributions of each decision-making
process to dissent are given by the relations:
Pinterpretation = Iinterpretation × SC
Pother = Iother × SC
where Iother represents the average indeterminacy of all non-interpretation issues
resolved by the court.

183

If the variation in the overall dissent rates between the Circuit Courts of Appeals
arises primarily from variation in the structural variables between the courts, and not
variation in the determinacy of cases which each Circuit hears, then the structural
constant SC is the same for interpretation and non-interpretation issues. Under these
conditions, normalization of the interpretation dissent frequency to the overall dissent
frequency at each court should yield the measure of the relative determinacy of
interpretation issues:

Pinterp Iinterp × SC Iinterp
=
=
Pother Iother × SC Iother

or less dissent at the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal when diversity cases are resolved according to the
law of those states.
182
Songer, supra, at 135. The variables most clearly tied to variations in dissent rates in Songer's study of
variation between dissent rates at the regional Circuits. were ideological diversity of the judges,
urbanization of the states comprising each Circuit, and reversal of the lower court's decision. Songer,
noting that dissenting judges tended to support the decision below, provides a psychological explanation for
this effect: the judge who must suffer the "loneliness of dissent" by disagreeing with his colleagues may
take comfort in agreement with the judge below who is being reversed. Id. at 128-129. Less
psychologically minded observers might argue that indeterminate questions of law tend to produce both
inter-court and intra-court dissent.
183
If dissents on interpretation and "other" issues arise independently, then the probability of any dissent in
a case presenting both interpretation and "other" issues is given by the relation Ptotal = Pinterpretation + Pother (Pinterpretation × Pother). With a large enough dataset, this relationship permits the probability of dissent on one
issue to be calculated if the frequency of dissent on the second issue and the total frequency of dissent is
known. Here Pinterpretation and Pother are measured directly so this calculation is unnecessary.
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To separate the variation arising from structural differences between the various
Circuits, I measured the incidence of dissent in all reported

184

opinions of the Circuit

Courts of Appeal over the time period for which we measured contract interpretation
rates of dissent.185 I then subtracted the number of reported contract interpretation
dissents186 from these measurements to yield the incidence of dissent on all issues other
than contract interpretation. Table 13 shows the frequency of contract interpretation
dissent (Pinterp), the frequency of dissent on all other issues (Pother), and the ratio of contract
interpretation dissent frequency to other issue dissent frequency (

Pinterp
)for the period
Pother

1998-2003.

184

Discrepancies between how the various Circuit Courts (and the corresponding databases) treat
unreported dispositions - such as non-precedential opinions and summary affirmances - make accurate
comparison and aggregation of dissent frequencies extremely difficult without manually tabulating each
case. Exclusive reliance on reported opinions increases the apparent magnitude of dissent, because
summary affirmances (which are almost always unanimous) and 'trivial' opinions are excluded from the
dataset. I use this statistic only as a common denominator to compare the frequency of claim construction
and contract interpretation dissents. It cannot be itself compared to other dissent frequencies reported here
or from other sources. In general, much of the literature on dissent frequency is incommensurable because
the parameters governing inclusion or exclusion of opinions from the datasets differ or are left undefined.
185
This analysis employed the Westlaw databases containing the reported decisions of the individual U.S.
Courts of Appeals (CTA1R, CTA2R, etc.). For each year the total number of opinions containing a dissent
was estimated by searching each database with the field search "diss(judge)," while the total number of
opinions was estimated by searching for the term "court."
186
There were no interpretation cases with a dissent both on an interpretation issue and on another issue for
the period in question.
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TABLE 13: REPORTED DISSENTS AT THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL, 19982003
Reported
Contract
Interpretation
Cases
78
102
63
97
105
67
145
141
89
59
79
13
16

Pkinterp,
Reported

Total
Reported
Dissents

Non-Interpretation
Reported Dissents

Total
Reported
Cases

Pother,
Reported

Pkinterp/
Pother

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
DC
Federal

Reported
Contract
Interpretation
Dissents
0
6
6
12
5
8
7
6
10
2
3
0
2

0.00%
5.88%
9.52%
12.37%
4.76%
11.94%
4.83%
4.26%
11.24%
3.39%
3.80%
0.00%
12.50%

79
189
218
263
276
437
227
398
837
185
165
116
223

79
183
212
251
271
429
220
392
827
183
162
116
221

2059
3058
1714
1492
3296
2619
4030
4308
5235
2128
2563
1545
1554

3.84%
5.98%
12.37%
16.82%
8.22%
16.38%
5.46%
9.10%
15.80%
8.60%
6.32%
7.51%
14.22%

0.00
0.98
0.77
0.74
0.58
0.73
0.88
0.47
0.71
0.39
0.60
0.00
0.88

TOTAL

67

1054

6.36%

3613

3546

34547

10.26%

0.62

Total
w/o
CAFC

65

1038

6.26%

3390

3325

34047

9.77%

0.64

Circuit

These measurements show a very strong correlation187 between the frequency of
dissent on contract interpretation issues and the frequency of dissent on noninterpretation issues over the period 1998 to 2003. For example, the absence of
interpretation dissent in the First Circuit mirrors its overall low rate of dissent on other
188
issues, while the relatively high rates of contract interpretation dissent observed in the

Fourth and Federal Circuits seem less remarkable in light of the generally high level of
dissent at those courts. It seems unlikely that the indeterminacy of contract interpretation
issues and the indeterminacy of non-interpretation issues co-varies systematically
between the Circuit Courts of Appeals.189 Unless there is a correlation between the
indeterminacy of interpretation and non-interpretation cases at each Circuit, then the
correlation between contract interpretation dissent frequencies and non-interpretation
dissent frequencies suggests that the variation between contract interpretation dissent
187

r = 0.90, p < 0.01 at the least.
Not so for the DC Circuit, but the low number of contract interpretation cases decided by the DC circuit
may make the absence of interpretation dissent misleading. Adding a single additional contract
interpretation case with a dissent to the DC Circuit would raise its interpretation dissent index to the highest
of all the Circuits.
189
Because the bulk of contract interpretation issues at the Circuit Courts of Appeals arise in diversity cases,
we would have to postulate that regional differences in the state law of contract interpretation correlate with
regional variations in the determinacy of federal law.
188
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rates reflects structural differences between the Circuits rather than variation in the
determinacy of the cases presented to them.

190

If so, this data validates the hypothesis

that the probability of dissent may be modeled by the relation Px = Ix × SC, the product of
legal indeterminacy and a structural constant characteristic of each court.191
If the variation in general dissent rates largely reflect structural differences
between the various Circuit Courts of Appeal, we may normalize the contract
interpretation dissent rates to the general dissent rates, thereby separating the
contributions of structural variables and of contract interpretation indeterminacy out from
the contract interpretation dissent rates. To normalize the observed contract
interpretation dissent frequencies to the general level of dissent observed at the Circuit
Courts of Appeal, I divided the frequency of dissent in contract interpretation cases by
the frequency of dissent on all other issues. If the structural variables remain constant
between interpretation and non-interpretation cases, then the incidence ratio
equal the indeterminacy ratio

Pinterp
will
Pother

Iinterp
. This dimensionless number estimates the relative
Iother

indeterminacy of contract interpretation issues as compared to the aggregate
indeterminacy of all other issues resolved by the Circuit Courts of Appeal.192
The overall relative indeterminacy measure, comparing all contract interpretation
193

dissents to all dissents from all the Circuits, is 0.62.

Roughly speaking, a judge is 62%

as likely to dissent on the issue of contract interpretation in a case presenting a contract
interpretation issue, as is the judge to dissent on any issue in any case. The utility of this
statistic, standing alone, is limited. The universe of possible judicial decisions
encompassed by "any issue" is so diverse that it would mean little to say that contract
interpretation law is only 62% as indeterminate as all other law. More seriously, we do
not know how many opportunities each case presents for dissent. The more issues
190

This explanation is consistent with findings that the probability of dissent is most strongly influenced by
court-wide norms on the acceptability of dissenting behavior. See Hettinger et al (2006), at 111.
191
Whether the remaining variation between the Circuits represents varying determinacy of the contract
interpretation cases, systematic variation between the contribution of structural variables to contract
interpretation dissent and to all other dissent, or simply random fluctuation, cannot be determined from the
data.
192
In less technical terms, it represents how often judges disagree with each other about contract
interpretation, adjusted for their overall disagreeableness.
193
The overall dissent index is essentially unchanged if the contract interpretation cases are restricted to
reported opinions only.
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present in any given case, the more likely dissent will arise.194 The indeterminacy ratio
measures only the relative determinacy of contract interpretation and all other issues in
the aggregate, not between contract interpretation and an "average" issue. It is therefore
not possible to draw significant conclusions about the determinacy of contract
interpretation law from the dissent ratios alone.

195

Comparing Interpretive Indeterminacy Across Multiple Issues and Courts
The useful comparison is not indeterminacy between an interpretive regime and
everything else, but indeterminacy between two different interpretive regimes - in our
case, patent claim interpretation and contract interpretation. If the same court applies two
different interpretive regimes, then the comparison is as straightforward as the relative
issue indeterminacies measured in Part V above. We are not so fortunate. Patent claim
interpretation is performed almost exclusively by the Federal Circuit,

196

and, as shown in

Table 12, the Federal Circuit interprets few contracts other than those with the United
States as party.
If we compare how an issue x1 is resolved at court A, with how an issue x2 is
resolved at court B, the structural variable SC no longer drops out of the comparison:

Px1, a = Ix1 × SCa
Px 2, b = Ix 2 × SCb
Ix1 Px1, a × SCb
=
Ix 2 Px 2, b × SCa
Because SC will vary from court to court, comparison of dissent frequencies
between different courts on a particular issue aggregates the effects of legal
indeterminacy and differences, if present, in structural variables between the courts. In
order to compare the relative determinacy of legal regimes between different courts, it is
necessary to disentangle the contributions of legal indeterminacy and structural variables
194

At the extreme, if a case presented an infinite number of issues, we would expect a dissent frequency
approaching 100% assuming each issue contributes a finite probability of dissent.
195
This significant point seems to have escaped notice in the political science literature. Theoretically, each
case could be tabulated to determine the number of issues which it presented, and the incidence of dissent
normalized to the number opportunities for dissent. The subjectivity involved in counting the number of
issues presented by a case, and massive scale required, seem to render this approach impractical.
196
A very small number of claim interpretations may be performed by other courts in the context of a
dispute not within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, such as the scope of a patent license agreement in a
contract case or a case in which an issue arising under the patent laws is raised only in the counterclaim.
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to the probability of dissent. We have no means to independently measure the value of
the structural variables SCa and SCb. If, however, courts A and B both decide a legal issue
of similar determinacy, x3, then the relative ratio of the structural variables characteristic
of those courts may be determined:

Px 3, a = Ix 3 × SCa
Px 3, b = Ix 3 × SCb
Px 3, b Ix 3 × SCb SCb
=
=
Px 3, a Ix 3 × SCa SCa
At which point it becomes possible to compare directly the indeterminacy of issues x1
and x2 between the two courts, employing only the probabilities of dissent:

Ix1 Px1, a × SCb Px1, a × Px 3, b
=
=
Ix 2 Px 2, b × SCa Px 2, b × Px 3, a
This procedure requires us to measure dissent frequencies at two different courts
when considering issues with similar legal indeterminacy. What issue x3 will present
similar levels of indeterminacy between our courts of interest? We could attempt to
define x3 as a single, particular legal issue that is decided by both the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the other Circuit Courts of Appeals. While such issues do
197

exist, the number of cases in any single issue may well be too small to yield reliable
data.
Instead, I define x3 to be the aggregate statistic of all non-interpretation cases
decided by the Courts of Appeals in reported opinions over the period 1998 through June,
2005, with a unitary indeterminacy of Iother. Because Iother is a statistic averaging the
individual contributions to indeterminacy made by all legal issues resolved by the court,
it follows that two courts with similar dockets and similar precedent will, on the whole,
be characterized by similar values of Iother. In other words, between two tribunals which
operate under similar legal regimes, discrepancies in dissent frequencies should reflect
differences in structural variables between the two courts that lead them to be more or
less dissent-prone.

197

For example, the Federal Circuit follows the law of the originating Circuit when resolving non-patent
issues in patent infringement cases.
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I assume, therefore, that the weighted aggregate indeterminacy of all noninterpretation

198

issues, Iother, is the same in reported opinions of the Federal Circuit and

(collectively) the other Circuit Courts of Appeals. This assumption is not precise. The
Federal Circuit is a court of specialized jurisdiction, and, as shown in Table 2, its docket
comprises a particular assortment of cases with distinct levels of legal indeterminacy. If
these cases, weighted by their frequency, are more (or less) indeterminate than the diet of
the non-specialized regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, our comparison will be
skewed.199 There are, however, centripetal factors that would counteract the pull of
specialized jurisdiction and tend to conform the Federal Circuit's Iother with that of its sister
Circuits. First, although the statutes and precedents determining the Federal Circuit's
cases are different from those binding on the other Circuit Courts of Appeals, as the
number of issues comprising Iother increases, Iother should approach a common level of
indeterminacy associated with the linguistic and legal precision employed by the authors
of those precedents - Congress, the Supreme Court, and prior judges of the Courts of
Appeals. We therefore would expect variation in issue indeterminacy to flatten out if the
definition of "legal issue" is sufficiently broad and diverse. Second, although the Federal
and regional Circuits might differ in the proportion of "routine" and "non-routine" issues
presented for their decision, this analysis is confined to reported cases with opinions.
This restriction filters the raw issue input to each court, according to the perception by its
judges that a case is legally significant enough to deserve publication in the Federal
Reporter. While we cannot be certain that the same degree of legal indeterminacy in a
case motivates each judge, panel , or court to publish an opinion, the selection of opinions
for publication likely exerts a strong normalizing effect and tends to make each Circuit
Court's corpus of published opinions represent cases with similar degrees of
determinacy.200

198

More precisely, all issues at the Federal Circuit other than claim construction, and all issues at the
regional Circuit Courts of Appeal other than contract interpretation.
199
One might attempt to assess relative indeterminacy by comparing the rates at which the Courts of Appeal
reverse decisions of the lower tribunal, on the theory that indeterminate cases are more likely to be
reversed. The difficulty in assessing the meaning of reversal, and the distinct possibility that a related set
of structural variables influences the probability of reversal, counsels against this approach. Whether on
account of these reasons, or others, the correlation between rates of dissent and reversal for the Circuit
Courts over time, or between the various Circuit Courts, is poor. See Songer, Sheehan, and Haire (2000) at
105; 109.
200
An alternative method would be to construct a multinomial regression model along the lines of Hettinger
et al (2006), and attempt to isolate the contribution of particular structural variables at the courts of interest
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To compare the relative determinacy of claim construction cases at the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and contract interpretation cases resolved by the Circuit
Courts of Appeal, I first estimated the relative contribution of structural variables to
dissent according to the equation introduced above:

PotherCA
Iother × SCA
SCA
=
=
PotherCAFC Iother × SCAFC SCAFC
where here I define the comparison groups CAFC to be the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and CA to be the aggregate of all the Circuit Courts of Appeal, excluding
the Federal Circuit. To measure PotherCAFC, for each of the years 1998 to 2005 I determined
the total number of reported cases, and the number of cases containing a dissent on an
issue other than claim construction. I determined the latter number, as shown in Table 14
below, by subtracting from the Federal Circuit's total number of dissents in reported
cases, the number of dissents that addressed claim construction and no other issues.
Dividing the number of dissents by the number of cases yielded PotherCAFC, the probability
of dissent on any issue other than claim construction in any reported Federal Circuit case.

- assuming that the database contains sufficient data about each individual effect to control for the effects of
docket composition. Unfortunately, the appellate database described by Songer et al (2000) omits the
Federal Circuit.
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TABLE 14: REPORTED NON-INTERPRETATION DISSENTS AT THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, 1998-2005
Year

Total Federal
Circuit
Dissents
(reported)

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 (Jan Jun)
Total

Claim
Construction
only dissents
(reported)

Net Federal Total Federal Pother, Federal
Circuit 'Other' Circuit Cases Circuit
dissents
(reported)
(reported)

29
29
29
31
52
53
45

4
5
3
2
1
6
8

25
24
26
29
51
47
37

224
221
246
304
273
286
266

11.16%
10.86%
10.57%
9.54%
18.68%
16.43%
13.91%

14

0

14

119

11.76%

282

29

253

1939

13.05%

The choice of time frame and court for PotherCA, is somewhat arbitrary, but the
choice will also dictate the selection of contract interpretation cases used for comparison.
There is no reason to expect Iother or SCA to vary systematically at the regional Circuits over
time, and little interest in such variations if they exist. Therefore, the largest (and
presumably most reliable) dataset, the aggregate of all the other Circuit Courts of Appeals
over the period 1998-2003, was selected as the comparison group. PotherCA consequently
remains constant at 9.77%, the value of PotherCA computed in Table 13 for reported cases of
all the Circuit Courts other than the Federal Circuit over the time period 1998-2003. This
choice requires that Pkinterp, the incidence of dissent on contract interpretation issues, be
defined over the same time period: the aggregate incidence of dissent in contract
interpretation cases of the aggregated Circuit Courts of Appeal other than the Federal
Circuit from 1998-2003. I then calculated the ratio of the indeterminacy of patent claim
construction, Iccinterp, to the indeterminacy of contract interpretation, Ikinterp, according to the
relation

Iccinterp Pccinterp, CAFC × SCA
=
Ikinterp Pkinterp, CA × SCAFC
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To explore the possibility that the measured properties of the Federal Circuit - the
indeterminacy of claim construction, or the structural variables characteristic of the
Federal Circuit - might change over time, I calculated the indeterminacy ratio using the
values of Pccinterp and Pother for each year at the Federal Circuit from January 1998 through
June 2005. For each year, I separately calculated the indeterminacy ratio using either all
patent and contract interpretation opinions, or reported opinions alone. The results, using
constant values of 9.77% for Pother, CA, 5.74% for Pkinterp, CA (total), and 6.26% for Pkinterp, CA (reported) 201
are shown in Table 15. Table 15 also shows the relative indeterminacy of claim
interpretation and all other legal issues at the Federal Circuit, obtained by dividing the
observed frequency of claim construction dissent by the observed frequency of dissent in
all non-interpretation cases.
TABLE 15: COMPARATIVE INDETERMINACY OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, 1998-2005
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
1st
half
Total

Pccinterp
(total)
1.45%
5.56%
5.48%
6.93%
7.50%
8.74%
19.51%
11.76%

Pccinterp
(reported)
2.56%
7.89%
7.32%
7.81%
8.16%
10.45%
25.00%
10.71%

PotherCAFC

SCA/SCAFC
0.88
0.90
0.92
1.02
0.52
0.59
0.70
0.83

Iccinterp/Ikinterp
(total)
0.22
0.87
0.88
1.24
0.68
0.91
2.39
1.70

Iccinterp/Ikinterp
(reported)
0.36
1.13
1.08
1.28
0.68
0.99
2.80
1.42

Iccinterp/IotherCAFC
(reported)
0.23
0.73
0.69
0.82
0.44
0.64
1.80
0.91

11.16%
10.86%
10.57%
9.54%
18.68%
16.43%
13.91%
11.76%

8.31%

10.16%

13.05%

0.75

1.08

1.21

0.78

Considering all the Federal Circuits reported opinions from January 1998 through
June 2005, we obtain a value for

SCA
of 0.75, signifying that circuit-level norms of
SCAFC

disagreement and other structural variables suppress dissent to a greater degree at the
regional Circuit Courts of Appeal than they do at the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The ratio of the indeterminacy of all patent claim construction at the Federal
Circuit from January of 1998 through June of 2005, to the indeterminacy of all contract
interpretation at the regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, was 1.08. Put simply, over the
period from Cybor to Phillips, the average indeterminacy of patent claim construction
201

These values are derived from Tables 13 and 14.
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was virtually indistinguishable from the indeterminacy associated with contract
interpretation at the regional Circuit Courts of Appeals.

202

The indeterminacy ratio of

claim construction cases to contract interpretation cases rises to 1.21 when only reported
claim construction and contract interpretations cases are considered. Claim construction
appears more indeterminate if we confine ourselves to reported cases, but the
indeterminacy of claim construction remains unremarkable against that associated with
contract interpretation.
The complexity of the calculations yielding the interpretation indeterminacy
ratios, and the uncertainty associated with the assumption that Iother is constant between the
Federal Circuit and its sister courts, mean that computing the statistical significance of
the indeterminacy ratios is not a realistic exercise. Likewise, year-to-year fluctuations in
Pother counsel against trying to extract much meaning from changes in the indeterminacy
ratio over time. Even without the benefit of statistics, we may be relatively certain of two
conclusions. First, it is highly unlikely that the small observed difference between the
overall indeterminacy of patent and contract interpretation is statistically significant.
There is no reason to conclude that claim construction at the Federal Circuit has been any
less determinate than contract interpretation at the regional Courts of Appeals.
Second, once the Federal Circuit's structural parameter is taken into account, the
picture of a uniform increase in claim construction indeterminacy suggested by the raw
claim construction dissent frequencies becomes more confused. If we were to rely solely
on the frequency of claim construction dissents (Pccinterp), computed in Part V and shown
again in Table 15, the nearly uniform increase in dissent frequency would lead us to
conclude that the indeterminacy of claim construction increased consistently during the
period from the nearly uniform increase in dissent frequency would lead us to conclude
that the indeterminacy of claim construction increased consistently during the period
from Cybor to Phillips. However, the frequency of dissent on issues other than claim
construction, PotherCAFC, varied considerably during that interval, raising the possibility that
part of the observed change in claim construction dissents was driven by changes in the
202

This ratio is proportionally sensitive to the ratio of the indeterminacy of noninterpretation (patent) cases
at the Federal Circuit to the indeterminacy of noninterpretation (contract) cases at the regional Circuit
Courts, which is assumed to equal 1 for the reported cases. If the noninterpretation issues before the
Federal Circuit are more indeterminate than those before the regional Circuits, then the estimate of SCA/SCAFC
is too low, and the calculation of Iccinterp/Ikinterp is proportionally too low. Conversely, if the noninterpretation
issues resolved by the regional Circuits are more indeterminate than those resolved by the Federal Circuit,
the estimates of both ratios are too high.
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Federal Circuit’s structural parameter. If, according to the methodology of Part IV, we
attempt to eliminate the effect of the structural parameter by calculating an indeterminacy
ratio of claim construction and non-claim construction cases at the Federal Circuit
203
(Iccinterp/IotherCAFC), the trend is not so clear. The relative indeterminacy of claim

construction appeals fluctuates with little apparent pattern over the period 1998-2005,
although the marked increase in of indeterminacy in 2004 remains prominent.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Four principal conclusions may be drawn from this study, relating not only to the
Federal Circuit and patent law, but to the study of legal indeterminacy as well. We may
set out first the conclusion relevant to the general study of indeterminacy: observation of
the United States Courts of Appeals reveals a strong correlation between overall dissent
and dissent on the issue of contract interpretation. Though not the focus of this study,
this finding may be regarded as a predicate for the other conclusions here drawn; not for
what it tells us about the law of interpretation, but for what it tells us about the study of
legal indeterminacy. In reported cases at Courts of Appeals, overall dissent frequencies
vary from court to court, and the frequency of dissent in contract interpretation cases
differs from the overall rate of dissents. Despite such variation, there is a high and
statistically significant linear correlation between each court's overall dissent frequency,
and its frequency of dissent in contract interpretation cases. The finding of a linear
correlation across multiple courts, between overall dissent and dissent on a particular
issue, implies that the probability of dissent at an appellate court may be modeled
mathematically as the product of only two parameters: one parameter specific to the
issue or issues under consideration in a case, and a second parameter specific to each
court. One cannot conclude from this data alone that the issue-specific parameter
represents legal indeterminacy. Nonetheless, in light of existing empirical and theoretical
work connecting legal indeterminacy with dissent, the most parsimonious explanation of
this data is that the issue-specific and court-specific parameters represent Ix, the legal
indeterminacy of issue x, and SC, the extra-jurisprudential characteristics of the court that
provoke or suppress the expression of dissent. The probability of dissent on issue x may

203

This approach is not rigorous, because some fraction of disagreements over infringement or invalidity
are connected to disagreements about claim interpretation.
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therefore be expressed by the product of these two parameters, according to the relation

Px = Ix × SC. It follows that if the value of SC can be measured or held constant, the
indeterminacy of any legal issue (or body of law) may be determined from the observed
frequency of dissents on that legal issue in cases where that legal issue was considered by
an appellate court.
Second, examination of the frequency of dissent in cases originating at the various
tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit, and the changes in dissent frequency over time,
shows significant variation in dissent frequencies between tribunals and over time. From
the results of the logistic regression model, this study finds that patent infringement cases
arising from the district courts are significantly more indeterminate than most other
categories of cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit. While this finding may be of interest
in and of itself, further study would be required to draw more specific conclusions. We
might wonder, for example, whether this indeterminacy is peculiar to patent law or
represents indeterminacy inherent in civil litigation at the district courts. This study finds
that patent litigation before the district courts is significantly more indeterminate than
litigation before certain Article I courts and administrative agencies, but cannot determine
whether differences in substantive law or differences in procedure are responsible for
these variations in indeterminacy. It would be necessary to compare patent infringement
to another field of civil litigation at the district courts to draw such conclusions.
Likewise, the tribunal data cannot identify the source of the indeterminacy characteristic
of patent cases. Faults in the patent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court or the Federal
Circuit might be responsible for indeterminacy in patent law, but so might the patent
statutes or the nature of patent cases themselves.

204

Regardless of tribunal, this study also shows significant variations over time in
the Federal Circuit's dissent frequency. The time-specific parameter incorporated into the
logistic regression model demonstrated that the Federal Circuit's first full year of
operation, 1983, also saw the strongest incidence of dissent over the court's entire history.
For most of the next decade - until 1995 - dissent frequencies tended to be depressed,
204

Theoretically, we could pinpoint the origin of indeterminacy by classifying cases and dissents according
to whether the contested issues were those of fact, statute, or precedent, and calculate the indeterminacy
associated with each aspect of patent litigation. One suspects that in most cases these aspects will be so
intertwined that objective classification would be impossible.
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although this trend was not statistically significant in all years. Following a spike in
dissent in 1995, dissent frequencies exhibited no significant trend until 2002. In that year
dissent frequencies were strongly and significantly elevated above their historical
averages, a trend which has continued - though not necessarily increased - to the present
day.
The high frequency of dissent in 1983, followed by a decade of relative quiet, fits
well to a model in which the evolution of precedent decreases legal indeterminacy over
time. At the Federal Circuit's founding, the slate of precedent was relatively blank.
While the Federal Circuit in its first decision adopted the precedent of its predecessor
courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims,

205

many of the

cases arising under the new court's expanded jurisdiction had no antecedents at the
predecessor courts. In its early days the Federal Circuit was therefore relatively
unconstrained by existing precedent, and it follows that more of its cases were
undetermined. The model described in this study - that legal indeterminacy produces
dissent - predicts that the court's early cases would generate more dissent, because judges
unconstrained by precedent may exercise discretion to fashion new rules of law; in later
years, as the body of case law solidified, fewer cases would present indeterminate
questions of law. That such a pattern is observed in the early years of the court is
consistent with the thesis that legal indeterminacy contributes to dissent.
The observed pattern of high dissent frequencies at the court’s founding, followed
by a period of decreased dissent, would also be consistent with a model depending solely
on the court's structural parameter. The Federal Circuit's first judges were those of its
two predecessor courts, and it is not improbable that 'cultural' tendencies suppressing
dissent evolved as the two groups of judges became more familiar with each other and
with the operation of the new court. Likewise, the era of elevated dissent – independent
of tribunal – beginning in 2002 could mark either an increase in the indeterminacy of
legal questions considered by the Circuit, or breakdown in the structural constraints that
tended to suppress dissent in the decade preceding. While the current data and analysis
do not discriminate between these possibilities, a change in court culture may seem more
plausible than a coordinated increase in legal indeterminacy across the various bodies of

205

South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (adopting, en banc, precedents of the Court of
Claims and CCPA)
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law overseen by the court. Further study – perhaps investigating the influence of changes
in court personnel – would be necessary before crediting legal or structural factors for the
current era of dissent.
The third major finding of this study is that, considering patent infringement
appeals over the entire period from Cybor to Phillips, there was no statistically significant
difference between the indeterminacy associated with claim construction and the
indeterminacy associated with other aspects of patent infringement litigation. On the
other hand, this study also finds modest but suggestive evidence that the indeterminacy of
claim construction cases tended to increase over this period of time, and were
significantly elevated in 2004. However, dissent frequencies in many non-patent cases
decided by the Federal Circuit began to rise around the year 2002, and we cannot ignore
the possibility that changes in the Federal Circuit's structural parameters contributed to
this increase in dissent; once we attempt to normalize the claim construction dissent
frequency to the overall dissent frequency, the trend becomes obscured. Perhaps the only
certain conclusion is that drawn from the logistic regression model: 2004 saw a
significant increase in dissents on claim construction, an increase that was mirrored in
dissents on infringement but not on invalidity, inequitable conduct, or other issues.
The critical literature identifying “unpredictability” and “instability” in the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence dates, for the most part, from prior to
206

2004.

It is possible that the critical literature was based largely on anecdotal evidence

inconsistent with the actual practice of claim construction at the Federal Circuit.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit’s decision to review its claim construction jurisprudence en

banc in Phillips may have been a reaction to short-term conflicts over particular topics in
the law of claim construction, rather than any systemic failing of the post-Markman
regime. But it is also possible that commentators and judges perceived information that
is not accessible by the methodology of disagreement employed here. Outcome-based
studies - which attempt to determine whether the decisions of different panels of an
appellate court are consistent with each other - have found evidence that disagreement
may be manifested as inconsistencies between the decisions of unanimous panels, rather

206

See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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than in the form of dissenting opinions.207 Further, statistical analysis of judicial opinions
measures only the incidence of disagreement, not the intensity of disagreement. It is
possible that observers were responding to an increase in the intensity of disagreement
within the Federal Circuit's claim construction opinions; perhaps increases in the type or
intensity of disagreement presaged increases in the frequency of disagreement, although
it is difficult to see why such an effect should be particular to claim construction and not
other aspects of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.
Related to the finding that claim construction, on the whole, has been no less
determinate than other aspects of patent law, this study also finds that claim construction
has been no less determinate than another interpretive regime, that of contract
interpretation. One might naively expect that the law of contract interpretation, with its
much lengthier pedigree, would have attained a more determinate regime than claim
interpretation – especially in light of the problems posed by the application of language to
new and complex technologies.
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It may be that both regimes have reached an optimum,

both equally limited by the inherent indeterminacy of language. Then too, the difficulties
in interpreting patent claims, relative to contracts, might not be as severe as might be
supposed. Patent claims are drafted self-consciously. Even if the patent is never
asserted, the drafter is aware that the claims' sole purpose is to delineate the scope of the
inventor's legal rights. Claims are also usually drafted according to highly formal and
stylized conventions rooted in Patent Office requirements and long-standing tradition.
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The final language of the claims emerges from negotiation between the applicant and a
patent examiner, both (hopefully) steeped in the conventions of claim drafting. Contract
language may also be drafted self-consciously to define legal rights, but may also be
intended solely for the benefit of the parties - a memorial of their transaction, rather than
a communication to a future judge or jury. Likewise, while contract language may
emerge from a formal and thorough negotiation between legally skilled parties, it may
also be the product of laymen scribbling hurriedly on a napkin, or may rest entirely in

207

See notes ** supra. The study of Wagner and Petherbridge, supra note **, may be regarded as an
example of such an outcome-based study, though Wagner and Petherbridge measured the claim
construction methodology employed by the panel rather, than the judgment reached by the panel.
208
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002).
209
See, e.g., 37 CFR 1.75(e) (specifying tripartite structure for claim); MPEP 608.01(m) ("While there is
no set statutory form for claims, the present Office practice is to insist that each claim must be the object of
a sentence starting with 'I (or we) claim,' 'The invention claimed is' (or the equivalent).")
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parol. Perhaps the surprising result is that contract interpretation approaches the
determinacy as claim construction, rather than the other way around.
The last major conclusion, and perhaps the most prescriptive, derives from the
comparison between how frequently tribunals are reversed by the Federal Circuit and
how frequently cases from those tribunals generate disagreement within the Federal
Circuit. Part IV showed that, for each tribunal, the frequency of reversal was correlated
with the frequency of dissent, although this study did not examine the correlation
between reversal and dissent at the level of the individual case.

210

The most parsimonious

explanation for this finding is that both reversal and dissent rates are driven by legal
indeterminacy; if the legal regime does not dictate a particular result on a given set of
facts, then either variation in judicial characteristics between tribunals, or variation in
judicial characteristics within a tribunal, would generate disagreement. Where variation
is distributed similarly at the originating and appellate tribunals, the ratio of reversals to
dissents for a given tribunal will hew closely to the overall ratio of reversal to dissent
characteristic of the appellate tribunal.211 If we observe a deviation from the general
correlation between reversal and dissent - if a particular tribunal is reversed at a higher
frequency than we would expect from the appellate dissent rates - then we have identified
a systematic difference in judicial properties between the originating and appellate
bodies. These differences would manifest if the originating and appellate decisionmakers favored different policy goals, or if the originating and appellate decision makers
differed in their competence to discern the 'correct' outcome of cases.
Such deviations are not observed in patent litigation. Although district courts
deciding patent cases are reversed more frequently than are most other tribunals reviewed
by the Federal Circuit, the same cases generate more disagreement within the Federal
Circuit. The implication of these data is that the relatively high reversal rates
experienced by district courts result from the indeterminate state of the patent law, and
210

Other studies of appellate courts have shown this correlation at the individual case level. See n. 144
supra.
211
If, for example, personal idiosyncrasies alone cause decision-makers to reach different outcomes in
indeterminate cases, those idiosyncrasies would generate disagreement between the originating and
appellate bodies to the same extent they would generate disagreement between judges of the appellate
body, once we adjust for the number of judges involved. The overall ratio of reversal to dissent is
characteristic of each appellate body, because it depends on the value of the structural parameter associated
with appellate reversal and the value of the structural parameter associated with appellate dissent.
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not from any lack of competence on the part of the district courts, or systematic bias212 on
the part of the Federal Circuit on issues of patentability or infringement. Indeed, as
shown in Table 7, once reversal rates are normalized to legal indeterminacy (as measured
by appellate dissent), the district courts are reversed significantly less frequently than
specialized tribunals such as the Boards of Contract Appeals, the Court of Federal
Claims, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, or the Merit Systems Protection
Board.213
The perception that district courts are reversed on appeal at unusually high
frequencies when trying patent cases has spurred proposals for removing patent
infringement litigation from the district courts to specialized patent litigation tribunals;214
a less radical version - preferentially assigning patent infringement actions to particular
courts and judges - has garnered legislative support.215 Specialized courts would
216

undoubtedly improve administration of patent litigation.

However, the relatively high

correspondence between inter-court and intra-court disagreement observed in this study,
and the observation that the district courts fare rather well when compared to existing
specialized tribunals, suggests that the indeterminacy of patent law, rather than the
application of patent law by the district courts, or the Federal Circuit's review of the
district courts, is responsible for the current circumstances of patent litigation.217 If we
212

Bias relative to the district courts, not in any pejorative sense.
Apart from legal indeterminacy and differences between judicial characteristics, reversal rates are of
course affected by the standard of appellate review. The district courts' low reversal rates could simply
reflect a more deferential standard of review, relative to that exercised over other tribunals. Quantitatively
comparing the standards of review exercised over the various tribunals within the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction would be a challenging task. But it is safe to say that few commentators accuse the
Federal Circuit of being overly deferential to the determinations of the district courts. See, e.g., John D.
Collier, How to Win in the Federal Circuit's Patent Trial Division, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2002, at
22-23 ("Scrutiny of the Federal Circuit's opinions in patent cases reveals that the court has its own patent
trial division, and its name is Judge Lourie.").
214
See., e.g., Note, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases after Festo and
Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1383, 1413 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 Berk.
Tech. L. J 877, 996 (2002).
215
See supra note 7.
216
Aside from the improvements that might be expected from increased expertise, centralized patent
tribunals would alleviate problems of variations between the district courts. See Kimberly A. Moore,
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 77 N. Carol. L. Rev. 889,
932-34 (2001) (proposing specialized patent trial courts to eliminate forum shopping).
217
A significant caveat to this argument is that it assumes the Federal Circuit possesses expertise in patent
law comparable to that which a hypothetical specialized trial court would possess. This study shows that,
in the face of the indeterminacy inherent in patent law, the district courts perform as well as specialized
tribunals, relative to the performance of the Federal Circuit. If the Federal Circuit is not particularly
competent in patent law - or is unusually competent in the other fields of its jurisdiction - then a specialized
213
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regard the current state of affairs as unsatisfactory, then doctrinal or procedural reforms,
rather than structural changes, may be the path to pursue.

patent trial tribunal possessing that competence might perform much better than the district courts currently
do. To assess this possibility we would need to compare the nature of the legal or technical advantages that
might be enjoyed by a hypothetical specialized trial tribunal with those currently enjoyed by the Federal
Circuit.
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